

gradual and, perhaps, even continuous transitions occur. But such sorts of transitions never lead to "implicit knowledge about . . ." which, according to its essence, is non-intentive and which is radically and essentially different from all explication as manners of *intentive consciousness*.

For these reasons (as well as because of those above²⁴) we also cannot subscribe to Heidegger's belief²⁵ that interprets the "mode of cognition" of "explaining," as well as "understanding," as an existential derivative of the primary "understanding that co-constitutes the Being of any There [*Da*] whatever" and which even regards the "Being-question . . . as the radicalization of a Being-tendency essentially belonging to *Dasein* itself, the pre-ontological awareness of Being."

PART III

Consociate Being Together

§17. THE REFERENCE TO THE WORLD OF FELLOW HUMAN BEINGS

In Part II we presented the most universal structures of the surrounding world of utensils to which, insofar as we live in it, we belong in the sense that its situation determines us in our concrete being. It is our surrounding world in the sense aimed at by Scheler's theory of the milieu. It is in this milieu that we also encounter our fellow human beings. We encounter them *because* we live in determinate situations of the surrounding world of utensils. That signifies that in these encounters *we are together with our fellow human beings in a situation*. The theme of the third part is to present the different dimensions in which this being-together can take place, to clarify the particular sense of being-together according to the dimension involved, as well as to describe the corresponding knowledge about fellow human beings.

Before we can carry out this task, however, we must still formulate a phenomenon already encountered in our remarks about the traditional theories, the foundations for the clarification of which are now at our disposal. The phenomenon in question is the seldom and scarcely expressible daily "conviction" that always accompanies us, that is to say, the "conviction" that we live in a human world; as we have shown, it is a phenomenon recognized neither by the theorists of the inference by analogy, nor by Lipps and Cassirer.¹ What, now, is the case with this daily belief of ours, of which we have shown above² that it therefore is not a "conviction" in a proper and pregnant sense because it does not refer to considerations and reasons? As a consequence, it is also already distinguished as different from a merely ungrounded conviction, i.e., from a mere prejudgment in which that being-referred indeed obtains, except that in concrete cases no motivating and fundamental grounds can be adduced.

We found two types of reference when we accounted for the references contained in the situations which belong to the surrounding world of utensils.³ We distinguished the reference of a utensil to the utensil-totality, to

which the particular utensil belongs, from the reference to the horizon which surrounds the situation. While the references of the first type constitute and express the situation which they directly concern, the second type of references only "co-include" just the horizontal, show it as discoverable and suggest the direction and goal inherent in the continuous progress into the horizon. In that connection, still to be considered, a separation appears in the "co-inclusion" itself. Horizons of the sort that are "co-included" are given in every situation belonging to the surrounding world of utensils; "implicitly" the references of this horizon are ferreted out in every case of standing in a situation. No situation is "autarchic" and made self-sufficient such that it does not of itself refer to something lying outside it, and it is precisely in this reference to the "co-included" horizon that the situation reveals itself as "intramundane," i.e., precisely as a situation of the *surrounding world*.⁴ There are no situations that are exclusively self-sufficient and thus, so to speak, are outside the world. The phenomenological characteristic of worldliness of a situation precisely consists of these references to the "co-included" horizons—horizons that fit the situation in question such that this fittingness itself derives its sense from the references involved.

Whoever is in the process of producing a work, for example, is geared entirely into the actual manipulation, lives in the manipulatory situation and has his concrete existence in it. By being given over to gearing into the situation, he is not, however, cut off from the world, as it were, withdrawn from the world; rather, the situation itself refers to the horizons and what is inherent in them. Thus the situation, for example, refers to what will later become of the finished work, e.g., to the buyer for whom the work was produced or to the anonymous multitude of possible buyers and sellers; in yet another direction, it refers to the materials that find application in the production, and hence to those who furnish the materials; in another direction, the situation refers to those for whom one works and who give the orders. *Thus in the horizons which are "co-included," something like a world of fellow human beings is found. Insofar as every situation refers beyond what is inherent in it, it also continuously refers, therefore, to "other people."*

The others are "co-included" and, more particularly, in greater or lesser determinedness—a difference which is without meaning for the phenomenon we have in mind here. Indeed, it matters not for the phenomenological characteristic of the reference we are talking about whether the other is "co-included" as seller or as the undetermined and, therefore, anonymous mass of buyers. In contrast, it does make a difference for the reference-phenomenon itself if the "co-included" others are "nearby," i.e., are, in a certain sense, "co-present," or whether these others become visible in the horizons but remain "far away" in that while there is a reference to them in the manipulating and doing, they are not deliberately aimed at. This difference between near and far lies at another level than that of the deter-

minedness and undeterminedness of "what is co-included." Even a certain kind of seller can remain "far away." If one takes his broken watch to the watchmaker whom he knows, the watchmaker can, while repairing the watch, find himself referred to his good, familiar customer; but this does not guide the work of the watchmaker. The customer is therefore not "co-present" in the repair of the watch. Suppose that I prepare a lecture which I will give in a strange city before many people unknown to me; in this case, during the preparation, I find myself referred to the anonymous and undetermined audience; more particularly, I do not know my public as such, although, as I plan my lecture, it is of significance if I come to speak before an "educated laity" or before scientific authorities, etc.; the anonymous audience is "co-present" in my preparation, which I carry out alone in my study, insofar as I take account of it by deliberately designing my lecture for it.

The fact that it makes no difference if the "co-included" others appear as these or as anonymous others is connected up with how and *as* what the "co-included" others become. They do not surface "suddenly," "accidentally," or "by chance." It is not as though, for instance, that during the performance of an activity something such as a world of fellow human beings is reported. The situation itself, in which we stand, refers to the "co-included" surrounding world in this being-reported of the surrounding world; its "appearing" is motivated by the situation itself. Accordingly, what is "co-included" in these horizons are other and further situations which have something to do with the work *now* found in production and, universally, with what claims our attention in the current situation now: therein is made known the possibility of *continuous* progress from the current situation to the other situations that are horizontally "co-included." In these horizontal situations the "co-included" others appear. That they *come to light in this situation*, and are not "near by" or "merely beside" it, signifies that they appear as belonging to the situation in their specific roles and function. The reference to the world of fellow human beings does not bring them to light solely as *human beings*, nor even as individuals with the constant individual determinations they acquire. They immediately appear, instead, as existing concretely in the "co-included" situation. Not just any "human thing" emerges unexpectedly and sporadically in the "co-included" horizon; it is rather the case that situations become visible in the horizons in which sellers, anonymous buyers, purveyors, employers, listeners, readers, masters, servants, etc., act out their roles. *As bearers of these roles in the "co-included" situations (and only in these roles of theirs), those who belong to the world of fellow human beings appear in the references mentioned.*⁵

For these reasons it makes no difference for the reference-phenomenon involved whether or not the "co-included" others are determinate or in-

determinate "individuals." Just as the anonymous listeners do not come to light as beings of the "form" of the human individual with an undetermined (i.e., but still determinable) empty content, according to which the fulfilling of the empty place would be tied, according to its sense, to the predesignated "form"; so even those "known personally" are encountered in this reference not as individuals of this determined, specific constitution peculiar to them, but instead as sellers, as customers—stated universally, as individuals *in their appropriate roles*.

The reference to the world of fellow human beings which we have made visible here is delimited in contradistinction to the disturbing intervention of the other. It still should be noted that the reporting itself of the world of fellow human beings in the "co-included" horizon is likewise cut off from its present in the public sector (e.g., on the street, in the train, in the "public" library, in the theatre—in short, wherever of necessity one has access by fulfilling certain impersonal conditions). Moving in the public sector is a wholly determined manner of human encounter; it is one being among others. But there is no continuous and pre-eminent reference to this quite specific encounter where the world of fellow human beings is made observable from the present situation of the surrounding world also and, perhaps, precisely when we are alone. Our ordinary belief about the world of fellow human beings within which we live does not signify, according to its sense, that we are continuously referred directly to the public sector; likewise in the case of the reference-phenomenon meant here the world of fellow human beings encountered in the public sector is at least "co-included" and, if "co-included" at all, then only in the ultimate degree.

This delimitation over against other phenomena has the task of placing into a clear light the worldliness of the "co-inclusion" of others.⁶ These others are not merely "added" on to the immediately present situations, to the functioning utensil-totalities or, say, the particular utensil-pieces in the situations; moreover, they do not emerge at random "along with" and accrue to any situations you please. Rather the world of fellow human beings appears in the "co-included" horizons which, as horizons, constitute the worldliness of the situation. That signifies that the world of fellow human beings appears in the world with respect to the world-connections to which the present situations refer, and in which they, in this reference, fit as in *their* world and *their* world-connections. In this world, in the horizons which make up the worldliness of the situation, the "co-included" others gain acceptance: "they encounter each other by virtue of the *world* in which, of essence, the concerned, circumspective *Dasein* resides." But, now, because the analysis of the utensil at hand is, exclusively for methodic reasons and unmotivated by the hierarchy of phenomena themselves, prior to the development of existential structures made social and which are determined by the dimensions of human encounters and grounded in their

own specific characteristic in question, the "co-included" utensil at hand (in the point of departure from human encounters to be explained below) is to be classified in its worldliness just as, conversely, in our actions we seize upon the "co-included" world of fellow human beings in its worldliness. As a consequence, "things" are encountered by virtue of the world in which they are at hand for others—a world which is always already also mine beforehand. Like the "materially determinate affairs" and fellow human beings, all of this has the characteristic of worldliness. Here we find the reason why—as we shall say later⁷—the fundamental structures of "being together with one another" also have a meaning for the "relationship of Being" to the "materially determinate affairs."

As elaborated here, the reference to the "co-included" world of fellow human beings is, now, nothing else than that ordinary belief about the world of fellow human beings within which we live and which continuously accompanies us. Because every situation in which we stand refers, as situation, to the horizons surrounding it, and because other people are continuously "co-included" in these horizons as bearers of certain roles, this "knowledge" about the world of fellow human beings as a human world is a "conviction" that continuously accompanies us. Because, furthermore, the world of fellow human beings is "co-included" in the situations themselves, our continuous daily "knowledge" about it has the characteristic, worked out above,⁸ of "implicit" knowledge which, for the most part, does not even become explicit and, as "implicit" knowledge, resides within the "living in . . ."

There is no intentive "consciousness of" inherent in this knowledge, but there is, instead, only mere immediate awareness of the world of fellow human beings that reveals the same phenomenological properties as the knowledge about the present situation and "what is co-included" in its horizons. On that account, the continuously accompanying "knowledge" about a world in which we live likewise has precisely the same phenomenological peculiarities as our ordinary belief in being within a human world. *Because the world of fellow human beings is "co-included" in its worldly situations and, conversely, because every human being-together refers to components and situations of the surrounding world* (in the sense of a world of materially determinate affairs < *scl.* utensils >), *we "know" ourselves to be continuously in a surrounding world and within a world of fellow human beings. Both of these beliefs [Meinungen] are in every case abstract moments in what one can call our universal "world-consciousness," whereby "world" must be understood in a comprehensive sense comprising the "surrounding world" as well as the "world of fellow human beings."*⁹ The phenomena and relations of phenomena suggested also make themselves apparent in a certain way in the findings of intentive consciousness, thus according to the thematization carried out, because, on the one hand, each physical thing has its "halo of background intuitions" on the basis of which it is "singled out"¹⁰

and, on the other hand, fellow human beings arise within the world of physical things and hence do not fashion a world for themselves.¹¹ The root of the world of objects inheres in the life-world [*Lebenswelt*], by means of which it is yielded through thematization. Here we cannot consider the problem of thematization, nor that of the modifications which result from it; nor can we consider the "demundanization" [*Entweltlichung*] in its hierarchical levels and its stages, i.e., a process which Heidegger correctly accentuates and which also hangs together with a series of problems, including that of the theory of science.

The present considerations also clarify the sense of our ordinary "knowledge" about the world of fellow human beings as a human world insofar as they allow for the difference of this "knowledge" in contradistinction to all empirical, intuitively legitimated "knowledge," likewise also for the phenomenological involvement with our "knowledge" about the life-world. Only in the sense yielded in this account can we accept something such as an "original thou-certainty" [*Du-Gewißheit*], according to which, however, "Thou" does not designate the alien personality of someone else, another ego, nor an individual in the whole fullness of his own personal life, nor a "structured unity of life" in Dilthey's sense; it designates instead the fellow human being *just, but also only just*, as he is "co-included" horizontally in the referential concatenations mentioned. Volkelt regards the "certainty of the Thou of whatever sort, of the ego of someone else taken universally," as co-originally co-given with the "ego-feeling," with the "ego-certainty," as arising "hand in hand with the feeling of the self" and forming "one essential connection" with it.¹² Because the "certainty of any Thou whatever," so to speak, presents a necessary correlate to "ego-certainty," it is also original in the sense of immediacy; it involves an "intuitive certainty" as the one immediate seizing upon experienceable beings. Volkelt's theory rests, however, on the traditional presupposition of an ego standing over against the world that is "alone" insofar as it is, "to begin with," imprisoned in the range of its own consciousness-processes. There arises, then, the problem for this ego as to how it bridges the gap separating it from the world. Volkelt regards the "intuitive certainty" as the spring-board overcoming the original abyss between ego and world. To the extent that the Thou is also an "external beyond" "forever remaining at the subjective pole in the ego" capable "only of empathizing with me,"¹³ the "danger of solipcism" arises which can only be overcome in a leap over the abyss by means of the "intuitive certainty." This is all the more so since Volkelt in his critique of the theories of the inference by analogy had already come to the same result that we worked out in Part I—the result, namely, that all these theories, admittedly considered in view of the psychological problem, either already presupposed or did not even arrive at the Thou-certainty even

though Volkelt held the inference by analogy to be requisite for his "critical justification" of the Thou-certainty.

From a completely different point of view, Scheler has even applied the problem of "eidetic knowledge about the community and about *any Thou-existence whatever*" and its "objective and subjective a priori evidence" to a "Robinson Crusoe," and has tried to provide an "intuitional foundation" for it.¹⁴ While this "Robinson Crusoe" performs certain "spiritual and emotional acts (e.g., genuine acts of loving someone else) which can only form an objective unity of sense *together* with possible mutual social acts," he is geared into "its positive lived 'empty course,'" i.e., into the emergence of "empty consciousness," "consciousness of non-existence," of "consciousness of a lack" and "unfulfilled consciousness," "the highest positive intuition and idea of something which is *there* as the sphere of the *Thou*, and of which he only does not recognize any exemplar." The spiritual and emotional acts which Scheler has in mind here in fact make a Thou appear insofar as it requires, according to its essence, corresponding "mutual acts" and determinate fulfillments. He who lives alone, and longs for people in his loneliness, experiences others precisely in the unfulfilledness of his loneliness—others who are there but are lacking to him. The meaning of this affective state consists of the reference to others. Essentially, the acts meant by Scheler make a world of fellow human beings appear, because without the others "pointed out" in this way, they would not be the acts which, as a matter of fact, they are.

That is to say, we deal here with a special case of what we observed as the "coming into appearance" of the world of any fellow human beings whatever—we deal with a phenomenon that fits into the other phenomena we developed. But it is only just a special case, though a very important one, and, in another respect, even, in a certain way, a distinctive phenomenon. It is not, however, the standard phenomenon for the a priori evidence of "eidetic knowledge about any community whatever" which Scheler takes it to be. He believes, that is to say, that the acts in question make accessible the sphere of community as an eidetic sphere in precisely the way ideating abstraction of a concrete nuance of red makes given the species Red and even reveals the eidetic realm of colors. Disregarding the fact that even the eidetic sphere of any community whatever is accessible by ideating abstraction from a concrete community, and that, furthermore, it is still questionable if there is any seizing upon the eidetic without the foundation of concrete singulars, our a priori knowledge about the world of fellow human beings does not even encounter the eidetic sphere of any community whatever. Rather it has the sense of a continuous, even though at the most inexplicit, reference to the world of fellow human beings. More particularly, in the acts mentioned a dimension of the world of fellow human beings is visible in a special way—therein lies the distinctiveness of this phenomenon.

But this distinctiveness signifies that in the phenomenon mentioned a "knowledge" in the sense of heightened pregnancy is only radicalized.

Stated differently: these distinctive phenomena refer back to that ordinary daily belief, and just on that account they are not standard phenomena in Scheler's sense. Only on the basis of that ordinary, daily knowledge about a world of fellow human beings surrounding us are our acts such as that of loving someone else, of longing for friends, etc., possible; they are only meaningful for a human being who already, in every case continuously and even if only "implicitly," "knows" in the midst of human surroundings, who "knows" each time that he is not the only human being. How should a person, whose world in no way refers him to fellow human beings, come to perform acts that suggest nothing to him by his life-relationships? These acts certainly do not break forth "spontaneously" out of the subject which, as human subject, exercises control over certain possible emotional acts and now "freely" actualizes such possibilities. The performance of such acts is motivated instead by our factual life-relationships. A "Robinson Crusoe" would not only have the real possibility of actualizing these acts, but they would be impossible for him in the sense that they would be meaningless to him under the circumstances of his existence: they would not have, so to speak, any "place" in his existence. Accordingly, the a priority of knowledge about the world of fellow human beings admitted by us is an encounter of what is at hand in every case by means of horizons in which something such as the world of fellow human beings is always already "co-included." But we do not mean by this that every human subject, thus even an essentially solitary one like "Robinson Crusoe," confronts an eidetic sphere of any community whatever in the performance of certain acts the actualization of which lies within the province of his freedom.¹⁵ Only with these modifications can we accept the phenomena described by Scheler in the total realm of the continuous phenomenal references to the world of fellow human beings.

That the world of fellow human beings is "co-included" in the horizons belonging to the present situation signifies—as we have seen—the possibility of continuous progression into these horizons. If we follow the present horizons, if we "actually" (i.e., not only "in thought") enter into these horizons and what is "co-included" in them, then we not only arrive at the present situations in which fellow human beings previously only "co-included" are at work, we also attain to the situations of our present being together with fellow human beings. We must now turn once more to the sense of this being-together in each case according to the dimension in which it occurs. The elaboration of these dimensions provides the possibility of a subsequent supplementation of what has been reported about the continuous reference to the world of fellow human beings insofar as this reference is articulated correlative to the dimensions elaborated. The phe-

nomenon discussed and developed by Scheler points to this articulation because it offers, precisely in itself, a special and, in a certain way, even distinctive referential phenomenon. But we will not explicitly carry out this supplementation because it does not, in any case, essentially touch upon the referential phenomenon to the extent that it is thematized in our context.

CHAPTER ONE

PARTNERSHIP

§18. BEING TOGETHER IN A COMMON SITUATION

We shall consider the being-together of partners in a common situation as the first dimension of the actual being-together of fellow human beings. What this signifies can best be made clear by the simplest possible example of people working together.

In cobbling a street, for instance, one worker lays the stones while the other knocks them into place. Limiting ourselves for the sake of simplicity of analysis to the being-together of *two* men, each stands in a situation which is their work-situation and each orients himself to the references in that situation. But because both workers are busied with one and the same job, they stand in a common situation. Yet, strictly speaking, the situation of the one is not exactly that of the other: through his work, the one prepares the foundation for the appropriate activity of the other. What is common to them is for the one a stage at the end, for the other a stage at the beginning. They work, mutually helping each other; each is related to the other in his dealings and his work. *This relation makes up the meaning of fellow workers.* Precisely because the one is entirely absorbed in the whole work and gears into it, he encounters the other as fellow worker and, more particularly, he encounters him with respect to the function that he possesses in the common, concrete work-situation. By accident one does not meet a "stranger" who—literally or figuratively—stands next to the work and is superfluous in the sense of the work-situation. Rather, the dependency signifies that one does not do justice to the situation and cannot fulfill his own functions in it when the other is denied in some manner or other. One is thus dependent on his fellow worker in the sense that his own situational comportment is oriented to him and to his comportment. But that signifies: the other also belongs to the situation in which I stand; his presence also contributes to the constituting of the situation and to making it what it is *in concreto*. It is necessary that someone or other¹⁶ be present and take on specific functions in the situation—that is to say, the functions which my fellow worker now fulfills. Thus my fellow worker is an integrating and meaningful situational moment.

What was developed in our example (in which the working-hand-in-hand-with-one-another is to be understood literally) obtains only where one can

speak in a transferred sense—thus, say, a conference where it is a matter of making concerted comportment and action understandable and giving advice about it—or, stated differently, the one who does not take the other into consideration and expresses his opinion without relating it to what is advanced on the other side, stands outside consultation in common even when he sits among others.¹⁷ The case is similar to one who is there only passively and does not participate in the conference, who is not even genuinely present, whose absence does not touch the course of the conference. Likewise, being-together has the structure described when one does not work together but acts against the other as, e.g., in a game of chess where each player orients his moves toward those of his opponent, trying to guess his opponent's plans and combinations and to correct his moves so that his opponent is thwarted, forestalled.

This sort of comportment, namely, in view of that which is to be expected from one's partner such that one takes his own measures and "answers in advance" by anticipating his partner, was worked out by Löwith as a general structural moment of all mutual being and speaking together.¹⁸ But this structure of comportment only has its place in that dimension of fellow being-together pertaining to the partner which we are now considering; the structure is grounded in what is constituted in this dimension by that which is essentially in the encounters. It is lacking, therefore, in the dimension of encounters of others which is to be analyzed later. If the anticipatory "answering in advance" is to be restricted to the being-together characterized as partnership, then within this dimension the structure itself worked out and over-emphasized by Löwith really only appears in its pregnancy where the partners are together because they "will something from each other," e.g., when the one wills to convince or persuade the other,¹⁹ or when they confer in order to agree. Should one make an agreement with his partner, or come to an understanding with him about a controversy on the basis of an already existing contract, then one is together with him in a situation of negotiation and, more particularly, one is together with him for the sake of making an agreement, for the sake of the controversy, and the like. While one confers with his partner, he faces the wishes, aims, and interests of the partner which, even when not explicitly expressed, are provided by the setting of the things. In virtue of the partner's comportment during the negotiations, his aims, motivations, etc., can be discovered. One orients his comportment with respect to the position disclosed by his partner; whereas, in anticipation, one seeks to "answer in advance" his opponent, whose responses and counter-measures are foreseen and encountered such that one tries to guide them in the desired, or in the least undesirable, direction. As a result, one's own comportment in the situation is tuned in on the other and takes account of him. Here, as in the cases mentioned earlier, one is related to his partner in one's comportment while comporting

oneself in view of his partner and his partner's comportment. One notices the presence of his partner in the common situation; precisely for that reason the situation in question is determined as what it is.

In the examples just mentioned, the "pressure of the external world" already obtains—a phenomenon to which, as is known, Dilthey had given special emphasis in his theory of the experience of reality.²⁰ But most distinctive is the experience of pressure and resistance in that being-together for which the existence of superordinate and subordinate relations are essential. The servant becomes aware of the pressure of the master when he is together with him in a situation for which the relation of subordination holds.²¹ Accordingly, he experiences his partner as the one for the sake of whose will he submits to this situation²² toward which he is directed and which also has meaning for him when he orients himself negatively to the master. In these last cases, the master experiences the resistance of the external world; he finds himself in the common situations in which he is master, precisely as master related to his servant and oriented to him and his comportment in a way that corresponds to his role as master. As a consequence, it is essential that pressure and resistance be made apparent with respect to the situation itself and in the situation-conforming comportment of the partner.

No matter how characteristic and essential the experience of pressure, resistance, and anticipatory "answering in advance" may be for some of the examples considered (as well as for the realm of encounters of fellow human beings taken collectively), as paradigmatic representatives of which each example engaged our attention, we still have not designated the structure which persists in all encounters of the dimension observed and which allows of being shown in all the concrete cases belonging to it. Simultaneously exhibiting the viewpoint under which the encounters of the fellow human beings involved belong together, this structure consists of the *being related to the partner* that we have emphasized continuously. That we are in a common situation together with the partner, whose presence and comportment in it produce an essential contribution to its constitution, signifies that we encounter him not only in the common situation but that we also encounter him *in the sense of the situation constituted in this way*. Our being-together is determined in its meaning by what we do in the situation of encounter, how we comport ourselves in it in relation to the partner and, conversely, how our partner comports himself toward us. The aims of the comportment are, obviously, also constitutive for the expression of the situation. One can describe perfectly the being-together of this dimension by the circumstance that the partner acts for the sake of a common concern. On the basis of the particular attitudes of the partner to this common concern, the sense is determined in which each of them is my partner. As a consequence, the encounter of fellow human beings within

the dimension to be discussed can be defined as a consociate encounter [*gebundene Begegnung*].

On the basis of these situational bonds we can see how far the personal presence of the partner is particularly necessary for being together, although not sufficient for it. It is necessary because the relation to a fellow human being comporting himself in the situation in question, by which he becomes a partner, is constitutive for being-together. If the master gives his instructions and then goes away, he may thus still remain very "close" to the servant who now carries out the orders; even when the servant, who is now alone, directs his comportment precisely in view of the expected re-encounter with the master, we still have here only an extreme case of " 'being co-included' nearby" and perhaps even a limiting case of "co-presence." But, in any case, there is no being-together in the pregnant sense of doing-something-with-one-another. On the other hand, the personal presence is insufficient for the constitution of a partnership-encounter when personal presence only means a series of people residing in one and the same place. If many workers work at a machine, and if all of them (though each for himself) produces the same thing, they are then neither fellow workers nor are they together with one another in any genuine and pregnant sense. Because they work *next* to one another, the work of the one does not itself become observable in the work of the other—this, indeed, lies in the sense of being-next-to-one-another.

§19. ROLE-ENCOUNTERS

The situational encounter-bonds of fellow human beings under consideration here only reveal their full meaning when we ask *as what* the partner is encountered in his being-together.

By appealing to what was previously discussed with regard to becoming determined by the situation,²³ we may say that if I acquire the sense of my concrete being from the situation, then that signifies for the determination of my concrete being with respect to the other that I am also determined with regard to one or many partners. Thus I am co-determined by the relationship that I have to my partner. In my relationship to him I encounter him as the one for whom I am *hic et nunc* and come into account; and he encounters me in exactly the same way. The relationship that each of us has to the other arises from the fact that we *actually* comport ourselves to each other in a determinate way. *How* we comport ourselves, in which concrete sense we are partners, is, to be sure, determined by the situation of our being together. Our relationship to one another is a founded relationship insofar as it has its root in the situation mentioned. In other words: the situation prescribes a *role* to us which we take over as long as we are

in the situation in question. That we exist in such a place in the role assigned us and *as such a role* is indeed everywhere the sense of the situational determinedness of our concrete being. In relation to the situations of being-together with a partner with which we are concerned here, it is important to note that the mutual role of the partner is already aimed at beforehand. The mutual roles are constitutive for the sense of this role of ours which requires them according to its meaning since they can only be meaningful in relation to this role of ours. Therefore we always and necessarily have our role in view of the role of the partner. In that fact are grounded the relation and reference to the partner which, in previous sections, we developed as the characteristic of being together in a common situation.

*The partners encounter each other in their partnership-situations in these roles constituted by the relationship to one another; they encounter each as the ones who are what they are in the particular common situations, e.g., as fellow workers, as buyers and sellers, as employees and employers, as masters and servants, and, more particularly, in just the roles which they have in the concrete case—as the coachman who carries the passengers on a journey, etc. Hence I do not encounter an individual in this dimension with his individual properties accruing specifically to him that constitute him as this determinate individual. As a consequence, it can be accidental and irrelevant in a certain sense—especially if one seizes upon it as a “structured life-unity” in Dilthey’s sense—that the individual is now in this concrete situation and has precisely this role in it.²⁴ But we certainly do not encounter an absolutely other person, as it were, a second example of the genus to which I belong and which I interpret by analogy or empathy and only make comprehensible by the “transfer of my own livingness” and its structure, of my own mental processes and their concatenations such that I conceive it in an entirely determinate way as *alter ego*.²⁵ The other is rather encountered by me as partner in just the concrete sense of partnership in which he is my partner *hic et nunc*. For me he is considered only as the role that he represents in the particular situation of our being together on the ground of his function in this situation and, in a sense to be explained, as the role that he also *is*.²⁶ He appears to me as one motivated by the situation which prescribes a role and function to him. Only in this role of his do I have something to do with him. In this situation, his being is exhausted in the role whose bearer he is.²⁷ What I otherwise still know about my partner is, insofar as it has no material bearing on the situation, irrelevant for his behavior toward me. Likewise, in the sense of our being together it makes no difference in what measure the roles are rooted in the reciprocal “life-unities” which each of us exhibits as individual. We are indeed together only in our roles, not as individuals. Accordingly, it also does not even follow that it is just the certain someone or other with whom I am now in this concrete partnership. This someone or other can be substituted by*

anyone else insofar as he assumes the function and role determined by the situation. In this sense, one can say that my partner is “someone or other in this quite determinate role.” This is because it does not signify any interference in the situation when someone takes over the role of someone else.²⁸

On various occasions we have considered Löwith’s book, *Das Individuum in der Rolle des Mitmenschen* [*The Individual in the Role of Fellow Human Being*]. In that book, Löwith expresses the idea that people do not encounter each other as individuals, that is to say, as encapsulated “monads”; instead, they encounter each other essentially in the “roles” they have in relation to each other and hence in “relational determinedness.” “Each of the others is thus determined above all precisely *in himself* in that he can have a *relationship* to a determinate *other*. Fellow human beings do not encounter each other as a plurality of *individuals* existing for themselves but instead as *personae* who have a role within and for their fellow world on the basis of which they then are themselves determined as persons.”²⁹ This idea of the determination of people by their relational significance as “*personae*” is, in fact, central to Löwith’s investigations. It is in this connection that Löwith arrives at the elaboration of the anticipatory “answering in advance”: “One’s own comportment is . . . not only directed *to* the other, but also at the same time *according to* the other; it regulates itself beforehand according to the other. The primary ambiguity of one’s own comportment towards the other is thus reflected when one in his comportment (towards the other) is *related to the relationship*. To relate oneself in his comportment towards the relationship signifies that I relate myself to another beforehand in view of his possible comportment towards me.”³⁰

Here we also see the reason why Löwith absolutizes this structure to the extent that he holds it to be the governing structure without restriction of all encounters with fellow human beings. Because he, furthermore, introduces no difference among the different dimensions of being-together, the encounter with fellow human beings is not limited to the realm in which *only* this sort of encounter has its place and basis (“ground”). By virtue of this radicalization, being-together occurs in the sense that “the one allows of being determined by the other in the measure that his own being [*Dasein*] receives and loses its existential meaning *primarily* from the relationship to the other.”³¹ Accordingly, there arises for him the problem of the “autonomy of the one for the other *in the relationship itself* as not simply an absolutized, but, instead, as an *absolute, relationship*”—a problem that leads back beyond Dilthey to Kant.³²

No matter how fruitful, now, this idea proves to be in many respects (e.g., in the interpretation of the “moral qualities” of the individual, say, “egoism” and “altruism” as “expressions of life,” as ways of comportment toward other people and not as “inner properties of an individual substance

which exist for themselves" because "I and the other are not objects indifferent to one another with immanent . . . properties"³³), it still is not sufficient to clarify the "relational significance and determination" in its own peculiarity and in its full sense in a phenomenologically satisfying way. The fault for this is *also*, but not *alone*, the circumstance that Löwith overlooks the different dimensions of being-together of fellow human beings in their difference as well as in their own peculiarity in every case.³⁴ The essential deficiencies of Löwith's investigations rest on the fact that he did not carry out his ideas on the basis of thorough analyses of concrete phenomena. Here, as elsewhere,³⁵ he orients himself to the peculiarities of the German use of language which he takes so seriously that he tries to make assertions about phenomena and concatenations of phenomena with respect to investigations into the "material logic of language." Löwith allows himself to be guided by the unquestioned obviousness of language rather than examining by description and explication the "affairs" in their differences, in their commonalities, and the founding and derivative relationships obtaining between them, in terms of the phenomenal itself, so that clarity might be created concerning them when the peculiarities of linguistic use touch upon actual phenomena and their concatenations and when linguistic use is exclusively present. Because he places on the same plane as equally justified examples of "relational determination" those of the young and the old, of servants and masters,³⁶ it escapes Löwith that the word "*Verhältnis*" ["relationship"] has a different meaning in each of these examples. The relationship between master and servant is characterized by both of them coming together in concrete situations and having something to do with one another, while the relationship obtaining between old and young exhibits a relationship between ages which can be, and at the most also is, entirely a phenomenal characteristic.

That is to say, that a man "in his best years" is older than a youth who only by accident sits next to him, and with whom he has nothing at all to do is suggested without one even having to take recourse to the exact numerical relationship of their ages. In the one case, the relationship is grounded in an actual comportment toward one another in concrete, common situations. In the other case, the comporting-themselves-toward-one-another is not even present: it is, instead, exclusively an objective fact which exists independently of whether or not, even accidentally, the people in question encounter each other in common situations. For this reason the relationship existing in the latter case will be called an "external relationship" just because it is not grounded in having-to-do-within-one-another. The sense in which a father "belongs" to his children is different from the sense in which an officer "belongs" to the military, and it is different, again, from the sense in which "an old man does (not) belong to young people." Only on the ground of distinguishing the relationships in which people

interact from those that exist "objectively," i.e., without the compliance of his partner, can the "relational determination" be clarified in its sense. But this clarification can only be accomplished in investigations that analyze the phenomena themselves and by returning to what any "standing in a situation" whatever means. In the same way, admittedly under inclusion of dimensional differences, the different sense in which we speak of the "belongingness" of human beings to one another must and can receive their clarification.

§20. MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING IN THE COMMON SITUATION

In situations of the surrounding world, life knows itself in "implicit" ways and contains its rules for this knowledge, i.e., for knowledge about the situation.³⁷ As governed by an inherent knowledge, this life is "circumspective concern" in Heidegger's sense. Obviously, the characteristic of this knowledge is not altered if I am now alone in the situation, or if the sense of the situation is constituted precisely by the fact that I encounter other people. In the preceding analyses we have already made different use of this knowledge. At its most pregnant, it came to light in the anticipatory "answering in advance." In fact, this is nothing else than an entirely determinate sort of reacting to the partner guided by knowledge about the situation and the other. Because it is thus a knowledge inherent in "living in . . .," it illuminates the situation *precisely, but also only precisely, as the situation* comes into consideration for us. In the "implicit" self-knowledge belonging to "living in . . ." we understand that with which we deal as that which is of concern to itself. Already included therein is the own specific kind of understanding of the partner in the common situation since this understanding represents a moment of "implicit" knowledge about the situation.

In the common situations under discussion *here*, we encounter the partner as a bearer of roles. Understanding gears into the concrete being inherent in this role. Thus we neither have in front of us—as the position that is the starting point of the traditional inquiry believes—a "piece of the external world"³⁸ in which we empathize, etc., and only when we enliven it, or animate it, or the like, by some form or other of the "transfer" of our own inwardness, do we then have present another human being, someone else's ego; nor do we prepare the way here for something like the understanding of the *individuality* of someone else. In his posthumously published fragments on "Das Verstehen andere Personen und Lebensäußerungen" ["The Understanding of Other Persons and Life-expressions"], Dilthey distinguishes between "elementary" and "higher forms of understanding."³⁹ Here we are truly concerned with what he calls "elementary forms of understanding," i.e., with an understanding that "arises out of the interests of practical

life." The situations of "practical life" are comprehensible with respect to their bearing on us: "The elementary acts, by virtue of which connective activities are composed, such as picking up an object, letting the hammer fall, the sawing of wood by a saw, designate for us the presence of certain goals. In this elementary understanding, therefore, there is no recurrence to the entire nexus of life which the enduring subject of life-expressions forms . . . we also need not . . . seize upon it as a method that goes back from a given effect to some piece or other of the life-context which makes the effect possible. Certainly this latter relationship is contained in the affair-complex itself, and thus the passage from this into that is similarly always at the door: but it need not come in."⁴⁰

If we set Dilthey's ideas into the context of our considerations, then we may say: *The knowledge immanent to the Being in the common situations understands the partner in his particular role with respect to the concrete situation.* The core of another person is either accessible to this understanding, nor does it disclose such things as the characteristic traits of fellow human beings; nor, finally, does it confront consciousness-processes, i.e., the *cogitationes* of another ego. What exclusively comes into view here is the partner in the sense of partnership in which we have to deal with him in every case. Understanding, therefore, concerns the way in which the other plays the role assigned to him by the situation. As a consequence, this orientation characterizes this understanding not primarily because it involves other people but because it represents a moment in the knowledge about the immediately actual situation-totality. This orientation grips fellow human beings only insofar as it is a component of the situation. In other words, we are dealing with a functional understanding. Accordingly, the partner is disclosed in existence *determined by the situation*: in the role that he directly represents and "is." Expressed in all of this is the fact that this understanding of the partner disclosed forms of comportment, of modes of "living in . . .," but not the properties which accrue to a human being as substance even when one seizes upon this substance as a "structured life-unity."

It is in this manner that in and with respect to the common work I experience my fellow worker. If he is revealed to me as a worker who is useful or clumsy, fit or unfit, then I need not reason back from the finished work to him as a person who shared in the production. While standing in the common situation with the other, I overlook this and conceive him in terms of the situation; I always already "know" about the suitability or unsuitability of his comportment. From that standpoint the sense of the fitness or unfitness of the fellow worker is determined: namely, with respect to the actual work in common. To be sure, the other is still disclosed *only* as a fellow worker; what he might otherwise be, in which sectors he might otherwise exist, in which sense he exists in them—all of this is inaccessible

to this understanding immanent in being-together.⁴¹ The considerations about fellow workers hold in a corresponding way for all forms of fellow being-together meant here. When I ask someone for something, I then experience the way in which the person asked listens to me, enters into the request, offers resistance, avoids the request, sets conditions, gives in, etc.; I do not experience something like an alien and autonomous will simpliciter. Rather a human being encounters me who comports himself in a certain way in the situation in question, who is unfriendly or complaisant, who allows this and that purpose to clearly appear or even be explicitly expressed, who lets a certain position toward the affair be known, etc. Even the one asked to do something does not experience anything like the "claim of the Thou" simpliciter.

Where it is not a matter of asking for something but instead involves a transaction, the being-together is nonetheless of a similar structure. However, here the anticipatory "answering in advance" emerges more distinctly and occasionally governs our being together. But such anticipation is only possible on the ground of "implicit" situational understanding and is ruled by that understanding. On that rests the fact that the demands of the other are provided in being together and transacting. One's own comportment is oriented toward this knowledge which is on the point of answering what is expected from the opposite side in a purposive way: just that makes up the anticipatory "answering in advance."

In common situations the partner listens deliberately. While each plays his role, he divines the purposes and tendencies of the other even when the other does not declare them—as is clear from the example of the chess player.

Expressive phenomena also arise in the encounters under consideration. While I am conversing with my partner, he shakes his head or wrinkles his brow. Shaking the head and wrinkling the brow are not in themselves unambiguous gestures, but they can mean many things. One cannot simply infer what a gesture signifies in a concrete case; it is not "inscribed" as this determinate gesture. Scheler's notion⁴² that there is a "universal grammar" "that obtains for *all* languages of expression and is the highest foundation of comprehension for all kinds of mime and pantomime of living things" is justified for a certain realm. But those ordinary and daily expressive phenomena, gestures, etc., that we have in mind here will not be understood on the basis of that "universal grammar." Rather it is the case that we understand them by virtue of the whole of the common situation.

Stated differently: the comprehension of this and similar expressive phenomena smoothly arises from knowledge about the situation in which I am with others, and fits into this knowledge as one of its moments. Even where I perceive that an expressive movement is not genuine, but purposively produced, and hence creates the suspicion that my partner wishes to

deceive me, this assumption need not found a disturbance of the "essential connection" between mental process and expression. In this situation and its "co-included" backgrounds this reaction of the other does not "fit" in. The not-fitting-in, the not-being-in-order, and the like, are phenomenal properties of the expressive phenomenon under consideration,⁴³ properties, indeed, that do not accrue to this phenomenon in and of itself. Rather they are only supplied by the total situation. In this total situation alone it becomes the expressive phenomenon that it is *in concreto*; by means of it and from it the phenomenon receives its particular meaning. The "same" shaking of the head can, as we have seen, take on different meanings in different situations, and in addition still be called genuine in the one situation and artificial in the other. What an expressive phenomenon is and signifies in a particular case becomes comprehensible to me in the whole of the present situation. By means of and with respect to this situational understanding, I can penetrate behind the actual reaction of my partner in a given case. The understanding of expressive phenomena is *as* understanding by virtue of relations to the situation of exactly the same sort as the understanding of what is totally present in the situation. But that signifies that a specific problem of expressive phenomena is not given in the realm of the being-together of fellow human beings under consideration here.

The understanding of fellow human beings presented here has a meaning transcending the being-together in a common situation. When we turn from a work, as we can at any time,⁴⁴ to the people engaged in it, they likewise only come into view in the roles which they have taken over in the work-situation in question. In a carelessly made work the producer appears as a worker determined as such and such, e.g., as a watchmaker, an architect, etc., who had lacked conscientiousness, just as a scrupulous, skilled, industrious worker appears in a precision-made work. But it is always a matter of a person *in his role*. Understanding is yielded here by virtue of the situation and is, therefore, limited to what is inherent in it.

Now, in his analysis of the understanding of someone else's volitional activities, Spranger⁴⁵ refers to the fact that the "psychical situation (the motive)" of the one who acts is "directly inaccessible" to the one who understands; but insofar as "objective cognitions also arise in this inner situation," that is, insofar as the activity is oriented toward determinate constellations ("situations" in our sense of the term), the situation is "subsequently controllable" and contains a component which, as a "rational part of the activity, is accessible to the other < *scl.* the one who understands > as objectively legitimated." The activity is comprehensible as activity in this whole situation with respect to what is "subsequently controllable"; on the basis of this understanding of the situation, the on-looker understands this concrete activity⁴⁶ and can make a judgment about it with respect to its suitability. The specific limitation peculiar to this understanding, which of

essential necessity remains bound to the situation and its horizons, becomes distinct precisely in this understanding of the activity as activity in which the "inner psychical situation" remains "directly inaccessible."⁴⁷

This understanding also possesses a certain meaning for the human sciences. Whenever it is a matter of a certain product, or of the concrete emergence of a historical figure, these are to be conceived with respect to the situation. On its side, this situation fits into an entirely determinate horizon of tissues of references.⁴⁸ As a consequence, the historical figure in question comes into view in his concrete role: Hence it is thus a matter not of closed and "structured life-unities," but rather of a *particular concrete existence*.⁴⁹ Nonetheless, at the most the historian would not be satisfied with this understanding of the particular situation and of the historical person in his concrete roles; even when he has not aimed at historical figures in their individuality, he asks about the underlying reasons as much of the persons in their roles as he does of the situation itself. A new book of laws, for instance, serves the needs of a certain time; the book of laws and the law-giver in his law-giving performance are to be understood in terms of the changed conditions of life, the altered economic system, etc. But, as Dilthey noted,⁵⁰ the historian can go back from the book of laws to the "spirit of the times" and investigate it. This regression does not depend on the whim of the historian; because of what Dilthey calls the "spirit of the times," the historian is required, consequently, to make comprehensible situations as well as people in their roles in a profound sense. But in this procedure of the historian it is no longer a question of an understanding in terms of the situation. We shall still have some more to say about this present understanding later on,⁵¹ although the problems of historical understanding can only be laid in the framework of the present essay.

§21. THE MEANING OF THE SOCIOLOGICAL CATEGORY OF SOCIETY

As we explained before, the particular concrete sense according to which we and our partner exist in a common situation, the roles that we represent and, in a certain sense, also are, are determined in terms of the situation itself.⁵² In the dimension under discussion here, we encounter the other as partner in the particular sense of partnership here, stamped by the situation of being together: we encounter him in his role in which he exists *hic et nunc*. "*Concrete existence hic et nunc*" signifies that the partner, to be sure, gears into the situational encounter, but that he also only has his role just *hic et nunc*. It is, therefore, already indicated that he does not simply exist in this role: a realm of his existence outside the situation as well as outside the role is reported.

While being together, our fellow human being exists exclusively in a

definite role. But this being-together itself has a beginning and an end. Beginning and end not only signify that common activities and any being-together whatever begin some time and end at another time. The beginning of being-together is primarily determined by the arrival of the other. The end signifies that he goes away. For our context it makes no difference if the whither and wherefore are determined or not. Existential realms are made known at the beginning and at the end of being-together, realms in which the fellow human being—whatever he may be and do—is in no case my partner and hence in that sense he is free from the situation common to us. Because beginning and end refer to the realms free from situational and role-existence, they possess a qualitative-phenomenal property and not only mean the objective temporal points of beginning and ending. But beginning and end exist in relation to the situation of being together itself. As a consequence, by virtue of being together and of the common activities in their course there are given in the common situation itself appropriate references, e.g., to the end of being-together. "Circumspection" is also oriented toward these references. For example, one must hurry up with the work he is busied with because it is close to quitting time. Or, because time has run out, one cannot suitably evaluate today a particular point and does not even begin to embark on the task, etc.

When one is brought to the end of the situation on the basis of that sort of reference, what would be characterized as the end of being-together is also visible: the reference to those realms in which the partner is no longer a partner, i.e., in which he is freed from the common situation, from his role and mine. To the extent that each place and each stage of being-together refers to the end, the possibility always exists that those realms are made to appear which, seem from the standpoint of concrete being-together, are zones of freedom—be that of my partner or of myself. Here the freedom of fellow human beings existing outside the common situation is manifested precisely in the ordinariness and everydayness which accrues to the "knowledge" about this freedom as a phenomenological property.⁵³ In each place and at each "temporal point" of the present being-together the possibility exists that the aforementioned zones of freedom are made known; the roles corresponding to the situation can always refer to these realms.⁵⁴ *Just as the partner gears into the present situation and has his concrete being only as the role that he represents in the situation, so the possibility always exists—essentially and necessarily—that he can appear in his freedom: as one who is still something outside the situation and—whatever he may be—the partner is, at any rate, free from the actual situation and from being consociated with the partner(s) who emerges in his role in the present being-together. In terms of these zones of freedom the situation of the present encounter preserves the characteristic of an episode (under circumstances, also a continuous and lawfully recurrent episode) that interrupts the being in freedom and*

which is imbedded in the zones, in which one is free from it, as in a "horizon" of its own sort.

The essential difference between the utensil in its function and the fellow human being in his roles is grounded in what we have just worked out. The determination of the role and the imprinting of its sense by the whole situation is not essentially different from the way in which a utensil maintains the concrete function accruing to it *hic et nunc*. For that reason, there exists, as we noted,⁵⁵ the problem of identity of the "same" person maintained throughout his different roles in precisely the same sense as the problem of identity of the thing that can, as characterized thus and so, be used many times yet maintains itself as identical in these usages. The utensil, like the partner, maintains its concrete existence only as what it exhibits *hic et nunc*. In contrast, of essential necessity there is manifested in the utensil no domain of its own freedom. When work is over, the tool is set aside; for that reason its meaning is changed. The next day one can take it up again. After ending his being-together, the partner can likewise modify his meaning; but, at the end of being-together he does not "dismiss" his dimension of meaning as does the utensil, which is no longer of concern. This "dismissal" of the partner has the meaning that he can withdraw into the realm of his freedom. Conversely, he can leave his realm of freedom for the common situation. The difference between utensil and partner thus consists in the fact that at the beginning and end of the situational encounter those realms come into view in which, even though only undetermined, the partner is free from the partnership and in this sense is his own master.⁵⁶

Because, in relation to the zone of freedom, the present being-together of the dimension under discussion appears as an episode interrupting just that freedom, the being together with the partner in the reciprocally related roles receives the characteristic of a certain rootlessness. Being-together is motivated only by situational encounters. With respect to a certain business one is exclusively together. On that account one also *is* for another nothing else than the *role* which devolves upon one *hic et nunc*. On such association *of people exclusively in their functions for a common affair is precisely what since Tönnies has been designated as "Gesellschaft" ["society"]*. "Society" . . . is to be understood as a multitude of . . . individuals, the wills and spheres of whom are in many relations with and to one another, and remain nevertheless independent of one another and devoid of mutual familiar relationships. . . . In the concept of society, the original or natural relations of human beings to each other must be excluded."⁵⁷ Precisely this encounter-with-one-another exclusively in concrete roles, the being nothing more than these roles for one another, signifies that the partners "are essentially separated in spite of all uniting factors."⁵⁸ What associates the partners is nothing more than the material affair about which both are concerned and which stands at the center of their being together; after settling this affair

they separate from one another and are no longer associated,⁵⁹ since outside this encounter of theirs they are unrelated to one another and are alien to one another. They come from their zones of freedom to the common situations and return from them to their freedom. There is nothing outside the present situation that associates them. In this sense we understand "human society as . . . a mere juxtaposition of persons independent of one another,"⁶⁰ but without accepting an "associationistic" theory suggested here and in other applications of Tönnies's theory.

Vierkandt, especially, argues against this associationistic interpretation of society, showing in his analysis of exchange and contract that in that context it is a matter of unitary and meaningful events rather than aggregates of declarations of the will, activities, manipulations and the like.⁶¹ Even though being together socially is, therefore, neither a mere accumulation of people nor an aggregate of human utterances, but reveals instead the quite determinate, "configured" structures which we previously tried to work out, it still makes good sense to say that in society "the individuals precede consociation [*Verbände*]: the association [*Verbindung*] is only subsequent."⁶² The primacy of the individual over social wholes and the "essential separateness" of individuals even in the consociations in question does not mean that these consociations are mere accumulations of people socially related exclusively to one another and who otherwise do not stand in any material and meaningful relation to one another. We must rather understand by this the pure, materially motivated being-together which alone is grounded in the situational encounter. These encounter-situations are made autonomous in the sense that the being-together with the partner is motivated in them alone and not in anything that would lie outside them. Partners only come together for the sake of the material affair outside of which there is no motive by which they would be drawn together. Furthermore, they are only for one another what they mean for each other in their roles for the sake of the material affair existing in the encounter-situation. If one understands the "essential separateness" of individuals in just this sense, then it is by no means incompatible with a structured configuration of the present being-together.

That partners are together for the sake of and only with respect to a common material affair signifies that each of them occupies a quite determinate place; each of them has his purposes, wishes, and interests the representation, pursuit, and advocacy of which co-constitute the essential sense of his role in the encounter-situation. In these he encounters his partner in his roles. And along with his roles, under circumstances, his countertendencies are likewise encountered. But where will stands against will, and where, on that account, one is referred to the material affair, there arise those forms of making oneself understood, of complying with one another, of uniting with one another, all of which fall under the heading of *contract*.⁶³ Being

united by explicitly or implicitly accepted contracts is, again, constitutive for the consociations comprised under the heading of "society" in sociology.⁶⁴ Derived, again, from the central and representative meaning of the contract, for which the principle of "*Do ut des*" is essential, is, again, that which we designated as the rootlessness of being-together. Because the encounters here are hardly "given by nature" and, in a sense still to be made more precise,⁶⁵ hardly a "matter of course," the common activity must be "artificially" and dogmatically stipulated between the partners down to the last particulars on the basis of their agreement. In this connection, "artificial" signifies that, in and for themselves, other settlements are also possible and that, in part, it is left to "chance" as to why this and no others are present. The "contract" legitimating the being-together is not equally central for all partnership-encounters. Rather the terms of the agreement are altered in those partnership-situations in which it is a matter of a contract itself (contract of exchange, of service, etc.).

But what is of interest to us here is that being-together itself is by no means a "matter of course" nor is it "given by nature," i.e., motivated by comprehensive life-contextures. It continuously needs an explicit or implicit agreement. Or, stated differently: in and for myself, I have nothing to do with someone else; but because I am "interested" in the same material affair, I make an agreement to come together as a partner. Accordingly, it follows, furthermore, that in a certain role (e.g., in the exercise of a vocation) I am not universally "there" at all times for everyone who is prepared to play the correspondingly mutual role. I have my conference hours, length of service, working hours, etc. Outside of this I am my own "free master," i.e., I am free from the roles that I play during those times. The establishing of certain times at which I am of necessity available to those roles belongs to the content of the implicitly posited and, universally, likewise accepted contract on the basis of which being-together occurs. In all of these phenomena the rootlessness of being-together is manifested in the dimensions considered here.

By virtue of being together, and by virtue of the meaning of comporting ourselves toward each other in this dimension, the signification of the sociological category of society arises as, we usually say, a social association that is only loose, cool, peripheral and held at a human distance. It is here that we must begin the interpretation and critique of those theories of the state and society which lead "any human society whatever," i.e., the phenomenon of the social as social as well as the political organization, back to the making of contracts. No matter how questionable these theories may be, especially with respect to their basic claim of an original *bellum omnium contra omnes*, they nevertheless express a justified idea which, in any case, cannot be pursued further in this connection.

CHAPTER TWO

MEMBERSHIP

§22. COMMUNITY AS FOUNDED COMMUNITY

Since Tönnies we are accustomed to contrast societal relations in their impersonal motivatedness and material orientation to communal bonds.⁶⁶ When turning now to the encounters of fellow human beings subordinated to the dimension of community, we may, first of all, ask what community itself and, as community, essentially constitutes.

The cool and internal distance of societal being-together stands in contradistinction to the human warmth, to the feeling of belonging together and of commonality, to the sentiments of benevolence, of solidarity and mutual demands, etc., that is, to everything which can be comprised by the expressions, "being close" and "feeling close."⁶⁷ Feelings of the sort named, especially the feeling of "belonging together and inner inseparability [*Verbundenheit*]," are for Gerda Walther just what essentially constitutes the community [*Gemeinschaft*].⁶⁸ According to Walther, when a number of workers of different nationalities construct a building, no community exists between them. They exclusively form an association which exists as long as they are directed toward a common intentional object (just the building), working side by side (in "intentional reciprocity"⁶⁹). None of this excludes the fact that these workers are indifferent to one another (because, for instance, they speak different languages), nor that their relationships are loaded with hostility. But if a positive sentiment takes the place of such negative sentiment or indifference, if, moreover, a feeling of an "inner inseparability," an "inner unification," and a "belonging together" is added on, then a community is constituted among them. With the appearance of the feelings and sentiments just mentioned the "society" is suddenly transformed into a "community." As a consequence, *feelings* and *sentiments* are thus constitutive for the community.⁷⁰ These feelings and sentiments, accordingly, exhibit subjective ingredients that are supervenient to living and working with one another, and therefore they can also be missing because they themselves are not founded. The addition of the feelings and sentiments changes nothing in the type of being-together under consideration: independent of all positive or negative feelings and sentiments, they are oriented toward a common material affair as fellow workers. The addition of those feelings means nothing for their activity if we disregard the possibil-

ity, for example, that the hostility would make working together impossible. These supervenient sentiments are meaningless for the kind of being-together to the same extent—as Walther explicitly states—that the worker knows that his community is of temporally limited duration.

It follows, therefore, that community is by no means a peculiar and special being-together of fellow human beings. Rather, it allows of being characterized as a "societal formation + supervenient positive sentiments and feelings." In this case the right to speak of merely supervenient ingredients consists in the fact that the sentiments under consideration in the present, concrete partnership itself, i.e., in the manner in which the partners are together (e.g., in their working together on one and the same building), are not grounded and motivated. Consequently, any solid relationship can go over into a communal relationship without effecting a change in being-together itself and, universally, in its phenomenological characteristic. This is to be understood strictly and literally insofar as everything, according to Walther,⁷¹ which is constitutive for a society is also present in the community, except that a further feature is effective in the latter.

Let us now, for the sake of verification, contrast this view with particular social phenomena. It is shown, for instance, that the concrete being-together of a peasant family is incorporated into a further, more comprehensive life-context and arises out of it as one of its moments. On that account, there is here no encounter of partners in their roles and, therefore, those who belong to the community are *also* something different from roles in a concrete work-situation. That they work within one another *hic et nunc* is motivated by the whole of communal life. Precisely in that fact lies the decisive difference from the relationship of the benevolent employer to one of his employees: here, being together in work is independent of all benevolence. It does not arise out of more comprehensive contextures, it is not founded in a life-community, and it is not motivated by that community. Employer and employees are together only in the communal work. Beyond this there is nothing that unifies them. In all benevolence and in all human sharing there is here no comprehensive life-context by which the particular persons would also be associated outside the concrete situation of partnership. If one sees, as we do, the criterion of a community in such a comprehensive life-context, then one would neither speak of "community" in our second example, nor in the one introduced by Walther; instead, we speak of a partnership to which quite determinate feelings and sentiments are added.

It follows, from what has been presented, that the feelings mentioned do not, in any case, legitimate the community as community. Where they are present, they have arisen by means of an already existing and otherwise constituted community. As a result, there is, in this respect, a further confirmation of Schmalenbach's thesis that the community neither has its

reality nor its basis in feeling, i.e., the "feelings themselves" point to a "community-basis" as to something already there before them": they "are only the expressive forms that subsequently emerge in the sphere of consciousness; indeed, they are products, generated products, of the community existing in itself, but not arising from it in the first place."⁷² Because feelings are not constituents of the community, the characteristic of a community that pertains to a consociation as a community is not changed—as Schmalenbach argues against Tönnies—when conflicts and rivalries take the place of positive sentiments and feelings, e.g., family quarrels, feuds among neighbors, and so forth. Just as the addition of positive feelings does not change a partnership relationship as a partnership relationship, so an existing community is not *directly* modified by negative attitudes. To be sure, in the course of negative attitudes it can be disturbed or even dissolved. But all that is only a *consequence* of the internal dispute, and is not already in the community itself.

The example of the peasant family shows that a more comprehensive life-context is essential for community. This life-context, which makes up the community as community, does not, so to speak, float in mid-air. Rather the life-context itself possesses a basis on which community is grounded and in which it is rooted. This basis is the *communal possession*. Thus, for example, for the family it is the communal dwelling space which, in simpler relationships (in Europe prior to the formation of capitalism), is simultaneously a communal place of work; for the rural district the common possession is "the village" and the homestead (the common pasture); for town dwellers the common possession is the common dwelling place, "the town," and the collective ownership of land; and so forth.⁷³ Wherever community exists, there is that sort of communal possession.

That *communal possession* is involved signifies that the members of the community do not have, say, a like or proportional share in it, as, for example, is the case with the property of a consortium. Rather the entire undivided possession pertains to members of the community as to one member who belongs to the community (i.e., to the others and to the possession). Because the communal possession⁷⁴ is related to a collectivity of people, and because the foundation of their community inheres in it, "the life of the community is *mutual* possession and enjoyment, and also possession and enjoyment of common goods."⁷⁵ Consequently, as Vierkant has called to attention,⁷⁶ the effecting of an exchange of goods and services, which also belong to the community, e.g., in the family, in the patriarchal household, etc., cannot proceed according to the principle of "*Do ut des*," no more than services rendered and returned are balanced according to their mutual value.⁷⁷

The own peculiar characteristic of community possession brought out appears still more distinctly when not considered in terms of economic

possession and the tangible.⁷⁸ Thus a family outside the family-possession is also united by the family-*tradition*. A certain "spirit" rules the home that prescribes a definite life-style. In the rural district, in the countryside, there exist certain customs and mores, e.g., costumes, the dialect of the area, etc. The ancient *polis* had its city god under whose protection it stood, to whose culture it was consecrated.⁷⁹ When we speak of the atmosphere of a city, we mean that commonality of the dwellers in which the "communal sense" has its root. Along with the common land, the national language, the past of the people, their state, their culture, etc., function as the foundation of their community. Religious communities, again, rest on beliefs, cults, and rites. By such beliefs communities are constituted which exist simply *in* the beliefs when it is a question of purely religious communities (to be sure, such communities are only given at a relatively later time in history). The places of the cult become the center of the communities and are, therefore, visible community possessions because the concrete life of the community sensuously appears in them.

Precisely these possessors are of great importance for the existence of community. One usually speaks here of the "objective spirit" in order to emphasize the independence of psychical actualizations.⁸⁰ In contrast, we prefer Vierkant's term, "the order of life of the group," because it expresses the essential bond of the formation under discussion.⁸¹ They are orders of life not just in the sense that they govern the behavior of the community and its members; they can only acquire this meaning secondarily in view of possible transgressions.⁸² The central meaning of the orders of life consists of the fact that they make up the community into a quite determinate community. The community lives in these orders of life in a distinctive way. Life is not only directed to the configurations in question; it also goes on *in* them, just as it is only to be understood in terms of these configurations. Thus, for example, a tradition determines the way people live. It is primarily not a norm against which comportment can be measured because it is an essential presupposition that one can deviate from tradition, i.e., that the taken-for-granted matter of course in which the unbroken tradition exists can somehow be loosened while it is followed. Its primary meaning consists, rather, of the fact that the life of the people involved is that life in the tradition, i.e., a life of an entirely determined style and kind. Moreover, the tradition, so to speak, is not subsequently added on to fully formed individuals, but instead people are just these and no others because they stand in this tradition. The meaning of the possessions meant here thus consists of the fact that they are meaning-bestowing for the life of the community and for this itself. Life, of course, has the characteristic of being taken for granted in these orders.

These formations are, perchance, still more decisive for constitution of the community than is the economic possession. Only on their basis does the

possibility arise of a communal life in mutual understanding.⁸³ While life is ordered this and that way, while this entire determinate formation has, but not as a matter of choice, never been explicitly accepted or in any way become questionable, in the sense yielded on that basis one leads a life which is precisely the communal life in which one is united. In living together we understand each other by making implicit use of our own self-understanding in which all sharing occurs. Because understanding one another in the medium of what is taken for granted has precedence, it fundamentally presents no problems or difficulties. On these grounds, however, the understanding of a "stranger" is made difficult, even impossible.

Each person belonging to the community shares in this "spiritual" possession, just as in the economic one, in the sense already worked out: namely, that the entire and undivided possession belongs to him as well as to the others. But the possession in which he has a share is a communal possession in every mode of sharing and is essentially characterized as such a possession. This signifies that the possessors, no matter what kind they may be, always encounter each other with respect to the community and are essentially related to it. The characteristic of the habitual and the familiar are grounded on this relatedness, which is "matter of course" and "natural."⁸⁴ But insofar as this membership is of such a communal characteristic and not of a personal, individual one, it refers to the "becoming co-included" of a people who, in any case, belong to the community in question.⁸⁵ They are "co-included" as members of the community; and that also signifies that they are "members" in sense reserved for clarification in the following analyses.

§23. HISTORICALITY

One can neither enter into nor be absolved from community-relationships, which, however, is possible and can happen at any time in the case of partnership-relationships. The freedom of coming together and departing, characteristic of the partnership, does not exist here. One already finds himself as a member of the community. One is born into a community, grows up and in it. This process of growth is not only executed without its own doing and hence without freedom, but as such it does not even become "conscious." Phenomenologically, this signifies that the growing-up-in always has the sense of having-grown-up-in, that being-a-member is a having-been-a-member-at-all-times, etc. One *belongs* to the community in the sense that one *has* always already *belonged* to it, *has* lived in it at all times, *has grown together* with it, i.e., *has grown into it*. With Schmalenbach,⁸⁶ we conceive the community as "the consociation . . . that grows 'naturally,' the belonging together 'by nature.'" In that connection, the "natural" is to be

understood, as does Schmalenbach, in the modified sense of comprising all "matter of course data and presentations," to which belong mores, customs, representational modes, and traditional goods of all sorts, but also, furthermore, economic property, local neighborhoods, and the like. It is "everything . . . that one has inherited in common, into which one has been born or grown up in common and by which one is born together or grown up together with others." Such data legitimate and found the community as a "natural" consociation because it itself is "natural" in the sense of being taken for granted and unquestioned. The "at all times" is distinctive for the "naturalness" meant here, and the connectedness of everything traditional as traditional exists in the "always-already."⁸⁷

As a consequence, when we belong to a definite community this signifies that we have grown up together with other people among definite traditional goods; also corresponding to that is the human membership with others of whom there is explicit "awareness,"⁸⁸ a traditional growing up together with one another. The traditional is thus constitutive of the community in a double sense: in the one sense, the communal possession founding the community is itself traditional, in which case it makes no difference if the ancestors of those people now living in it have inherited it from their forebears or if it has been formed in the first place by their living together. In the second sense, the comprehensive life-context, which bears the communal being-together and embraces the actual encounters and encounter-situations, also has a traditional feature. As being-together, being-together is founded neither in the material (as in the case of the partnership), nor in the emotional (as in the case of the "group" [*Bund*]),⁸⁹ it rests, instead, upon itself and has its ground as well as its legitimation in the traditionality peculiar to it.

This emphasis on the traditional as a constituent of the community contradicts the reference by Tönnies and Schmalenbach to association by blood relationship⁹⁰—a reference that is the more significant as one is accustomed to regard the family as the paradigm of the community. However, the question whether blood kinship alone can ground the community is rather an irrelevant question because the living-together of the family is always a living-together at a place in common and with a "mind" in common, i.e., a living-together founded in a communal possession. This is also accepted by the writers mentioned. Although, according to Tönnies,⁹¹ "community as a bond of 'blood' is a physical relation *in the first place*," and only secondarily modified into a relation to objects, the "community by *blood*, denoting unity of being, is developed and differentiated into community of *place* which has its immediate expression in dwelling together, and this is differentiated again into a community of *mind*. . . ."⁹² The particular "social force and sympathy, which holds people together as members of a whole," is "understanding (*consensus*)" as the "simplest expression for the inner

nature and the truth of all genuine living, dwelling and working together."⁹³ More clearly and sharply than Tönnies, Schmalenbach⁹⁴ emphasizes that the mere factuality of kinship of blood is insufficient to ground the community, and that even "knowledge" about this only allows for the emergence of something like "community-consciousness" because in the "external, 'physical' kinship of blood something 'internal,' 'psychical' is seen: a 'spiritual kinship of blood.'" This "spiritual kinship of blood" signifies, however, the very living and sharing in a communal "spirit" which is a traditionalized one, although there is no explicit consciousness of it.

In the present considerations there already appears the *historicality* immanent in and essential for being together in the community. The comprehensive life-context which presents the community, and in which we are associated with others in particular, rests, more particularly, on itself, but projects into the past in which it has its roots. Tönnies had already noted this in his theory of "natural will" and "rational will" ["*Wesenswillen und Kürwillen*"] with which he psychologically supports the distinction between "community" and "society." The "natural will" corresponding to the community is "derived from and must be explained only in terms of the past."⁹⁵ In contrast, the "rational will," corresponding to society, allows of "being understood only with respect to the future developments with which it is concerned." If we belong to a certain community, we are then restricted to the past and stand with it and past generations in an appertinent relation.⁹⁶ This bond, however, is not an "external" one. It rather has the sense of being rooted in the past and of stemming from it. By being a member of a certain community, we are in every case already given as stemming from here and there, as rooted here and there, as having grown up determined by virtue of these and those historical forces. This historical "destiny" determines us in our being.⁹⁷ It determines the way we understand the world and ourselves,⁹⁸ and imposes a direction on our lives. This existential meaning has the past (and it can only have the past) because what is past, of which we speak here, is not what only has been, is not what lies behind us as finished and closed. That the latter is not the case has been emphatically pointed out by Scheler.⁹⁹ The past, to which we are tied, lives in us; we extend it, have it as our own. We *are*—as Heidegger says—always already our own past. The historical is not attached to us, but instead determines us in accordance with our essence because it is a living past handed down to us, i.e., a living force in us.

We therefore determine ourselves as *essentially historical beings*. The *communalization of people always already signifies its historicalization* [*Vergesellschaftlichung*]. Like historicalization, communalizations are not, however, external determinations subsequently added on in some manner or other; rather, they designate fundamental moments of human existence. For man does not simply find himself *in* the world because he is a determinate

manner of being in the world; rather, as a result, he always already, as it were, grows up into the "spiritual" world. This signifies: *in advance, a human being is not solus ipse; insofar as he is communalized and historicalized, he always already belongs to other human beings, e.g., to those among whom he grew up to be a person of his generation, etc.*¹⁰⁰ This membership signifies a "kinship" because it is rooted in a common past and shares the same historical forces and motives.¹⁰¹ As a consequence, in the case of the community, the sense results that characterized the priority of the "whole" over the "parts." The particular persons "in their relations to one another are to be conceived here only in terms of the whole which is alive in them."¹⁰² As a result, the concrete situations in which they encounter each other are to be conceived only in terms of the life-context that embraces them and, in a profounder sense, they are to be conceived only in terms of its historicality. By virtue of these grounds, the members of the community are also "associated . . . in spite of all separations."¹⁰³ Because membership means here "rooted in . . ." and "stemming from . . .," the frequently used mode of speaking of an "extension of the ego" seems inadequate to us with respect to the community because, again, it approximates the idea of an originally solitary ego. But the community possession belongs to me in the sense described above¹⁰⁴ insofar as I am grown up in it, stem from it, am rooted in it, and the like. The same characteristic of being-grown-up-together-with-one-another also has the characteristic of members belonging to the community: if one speaks of "the other *in me*,"¹⁰⁵ then that concerns not the community but rather the group.

The relation to the past and to life by virtue of its forces has its most pregnant expression in the ideas of Graf Yorck von Wartenburg, an expression found in his correspondence with Dilthey.¹⁰⁶ One of Yorck's most central ideas is that of the essential historicality as a constituent of human existence: ". . . a self-examination directed not to an abstract ego but instead to the fullness of myself, finds me historically determined, just as physics cognizes me as cosmically determined. I am history as much as Nature, and thus we understand the penetrating remark of Goethe of having lived at least three thousand years."¹⁰⁷ But for Yorck history is not the set of events that are past and have been in the sense of no longer being present. On the contrary: "Only what has the force of making present, what can be exhibited in the present, belongs to the realm of history."¹⁰⁸ In the truly historical sense, the historical figures come into view not as types but rather as forces and motives. In contrast to Dilthey's essay, "Auffassung und Analyse des Menschen im XV und XVI Jahrhundert" ["Comprehension and Analysis of Man in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries"],¹⁰⁹ Yorck notes: "Even more the types allow of transformation into force and, accordingly, the past is made present"; Luther especially "must be considered as a historical force, as a historical motive, not as a moral type."¹¹⁰ In agreement with

Dilthey, Yorck holds that the concept of history "is indeed the concept of a connexus of forces, of force-unities, to which the category, form only of transferrable masses, should be applied."¹¹¹ Depending on these forces and motives, on the invisible,¹¹² on the "life-place," "is the introduction and determination of a new epoch."¹¹³ Because what are truly historical are the historical motives, and because the historicity of human existence of our lives is determined by virtue of historical motives, everything historical is "fraternal and akin, the stuff of history is our own flesh and blood."¹¹⁴

The means of cognition for the historical is "included in the psychological capital of structured vitality" and life itself is "the organon for the conception of historical vitality."¹¹⁵ Because everything historical is human and everything human is historical, this familiarity with everything historical signifies, at the same time, a familiarity with everything human: ". . . my structured, unitary vitality . . . is the organon for seizing upon and cognizing everything alive." In the human or the historical "the relationship is an immediate one."¹¹⁶ In explicit opposition to Dilthey's doctrine of the "transposition" of one's own inner experiences into other human bodies,¹¹⁷ Yorck emphasizes that the "rapport" between one human being and another is original and immediate.¹¹⁸ No transference is needed since an "immediate vital membership" is present. Dilthey had held that "spiritual facts are given in sensuous objects and . . . the spiritual facts are supervenient to psychical states and events." In contradistinction, Yorck explains that "this is an entirely irrelevant relation." "A solipscism as posited at the start is an obstruction which in itself is an interesting psychical phenomenon worthy of being explained." "Luther, Augustine, Paul effect me in the present and incorporeally. The effect is immediate and autonomous, which has nothing to do with the ineffective reflection that I would be able to see their bodies were they still living. . . . The historical effect that occurs from person to person as well as also among contemporaries, personal acquaintances, is not only not ontic, but also not somatically conditioned."¹¹⁹

Because Yorck sees man as the being who lives by virtue of historical forces and motives, he conceives him in advance in the essential association and membership with fellow human beings who have the same origin and exist by virtue of the same historical sources. On the basis of his own existence, for which communalization and historicalization are constitutive, a similarly immediate understanding of everything human arises in the immediate "rapport." Here there is neither the problem of the kind of the problem of access, nor is any sort of technical, theoretical arrangement needed such as the inference by analogy, transferences, empathic projections, etc. Yorck's remark about the means of cognition for the historical and the living is to be understood in the sense of this immediate "rapport" between human being and human being, which is "included in the psychical capital of structured vitality" and "the ulti-

mate methodological presupposition of which is its own vitality."¹²⁰

For Yorck this historical communalization is, however, not a dimension of being-together of fellow human beings next to one another as we understand it here; it appears to him rather as the paradigmatic and even normative phenomenon of being-with-one-another so that every case of being-together of fellow human beings that is not to be characterized as historical communalization is accepted by him as the decay of the true and genuine life. As a consequence, he turns against Dilthey's "uniformity of facts of one's own inner experience with those which we are required to transfer to the other human bodies," "a feature of spiritual facts" which ought to replace "the identity of reason in the speculative school."¹²¹ From this one-sided standpoint he is, therefore, right in so far as the "uniformity," according to its sense, presupposes human beings existentially independent of one another who are essentially unassociated and who come together in concrete situations for the sake of a determinate affair and in relation to it. In all of the reciprocal referredness in the situations in question they remain free, i.e., in the sense here of being alien to one another. "Uniformity" then means the recognition of freedom of the partner and of oneself as one's own goal which does not exhaust the partner's full being in the role in which he is together with me *hic et nunc*. This recognition also has, furthermore, its consequences for the comportment toward the other in the situation in common.

If one begins with this "social" being-together and absolutizes it, then there results as a consequence a quite determined human-scientific problem related to the understanding of others. But for Yorck this "social" being-together is a disintegration of the original $\delta\epsilon\iota\mu\delta\varsigma$ of the existence of fellow human beings, of that historical communalization as one of the fundamental determinations of human existence. This one-sidedness experiences the radicalization indicative of the limits of Yorck's thinking in that he alone only accepts the Christian community as the genuine and full $\theta\upsilon\nu\delta\epsilon\iota\mu\delta\varsigma$, Christianity as the *historical force par excellence*; as a consequence, human solidarity in the proper sense obtains for him as the solidarity before God (in Luther's sense). Dilthey rightly objected to this one-sidedness; to Yorck's remark that "Jesus is nothing else but a man and a historical force," that "Without this virtual attribution and transfer of force there would be no history," Dilthey observed that, "conversely: *all* history is mere transfer of force, not just the life of Christ."¹²² However, in the present context we must refrain from an inquiry into the motives and roots of this one-sidedness of Yorck.

§24. THE LIMITS OF MEMBERSHIP

We define membership in a particular community as "natural" in the sense of the taken-for-grantedness of historical and historically legitimated "data and events." That one has grown up in just this and no other life-context, that one belongs to this and no other people, is his "destiny" and simple "givenness"; it is and remains deprived of personal will and decision. The people to whom one belongs in the sense of community have not been selected in a free choice, one has neither decided in favor of them nor for them because they have these and those personal qualities; rather the membership in just this community of fellows is based upon the fact that one has the same heritage as they, lives in virtue of the same past, i.e., of their same historical forces and motives, is born into a life-context to which they also belong, etc. All of that belongs to the circumstances of life which are representative for each "givenness" and in respect of which there is no freedom of choice.¹²³ This signifies: *the being together in the dimension of the community is therefore not a being together of individuals as individuals.* Because membership is grounded in the communal possession, it extends as far as the participation in and restriction [*Gebundenheit*] to this; the members of a community do not run into one another; they do not belong to each other absolutely and unconditionally, but only insofar as they are associated by the communal possession as participants in this possession.

This membership, articulated and delimited in this way, signifies the "We" of the community by which those who say "We" make known the fact that they belong to others.¹²⁴ As a consequence, "we" make explicit what is immanent in each present being-together in the community as "implicit" knowledge even when it is not explicit. (This making explicit is, however, not an explication in the sense of intentional consciousness, but instead a form or stuff of the "implicit" knowledge itself in the sense of earlier discussions.) When Oppenheimer¹²⁵ describes the "consciousness of We" as "consciousness of the membership in a group [*Gruppe*]" (distinguishing membership from dependency) such that "the individual feels himself directly *as group, as community,*" then by the feeling united as "one" he means an attitude of the group but not the "implicit" knowledge about one's own membership in the Being of the community.¹²⁶ Similarly, as is yet to be shown, the "consciousness of We," as Vierkanndt describes it,¹²⁷ is related to the to-one-another of members of the group and not to those who belong to the community.

In the dimension of the community, the "one" [*das "Man"*] has a sense corresponding to that of the "We": it designates the members precisely in relation to their membership. When it is said: "one does not do this and that," this signifies that the comportment meant stands in contradiction to the style of life and order of life constituted by traditions (religious ideas,

mores, and the like), or that it at least does not correspond to them. On the basis of his membership in the community, and the implicit restriction to its order of life in the community, which always obtains as normative and binding, the one who belongs to the community in question, precisely as one who belongs, "should" do just this and not that.¹²⁸ But such a "one should" or "one should not" is not related to every deed of members of the community; they are related rather only to that deed which falls into the domain governed by the order of life of the community. The limits of communal membership are made manifest in the fact that not all domains of life and action confront the orders of life. These limits emerge in the most pregnant way in the phenomenon of communal solidarity, of which Vierkanndt has shown¹²⁹ that they hold for members of the community only insofar as it is a question of concerns that touch upon a given community. From this communal solidarity and helpfulness is to be distinguished the personal solidarity which is related to others as individuals.

In spite of the extent of membership, there remains to the member of the community a private sphere,¹³⁰ i.e., a realm of life and action with respect to which the member does not grow older with others and for which, as a consequence, no regulations based on the life of the community even exist. If he lives *in this realm*, then the members of the community (as well as the community in question) are determined as the members they are in this given case, namely as "present." He comports himself there without regard to them. This signifies: in this realm he is free from the community. The existence of such realms free from the community is the condition for the possibility that among individual members of the community new kinds of personal relations arise and, to be sure, relations pertaining to the group. There is, accordingly, a double sense in which these new personal relations, which are at the least group-relations in origin, are not founded in and motivated by the community and the membership in it (though, in fact, they facilitate the beginning of such relations and, under certain circumstances, even make them possible). In the one case, it is not inherent in the sense of a community-relationship that members of the community generally transcend the bonds of the community to new sorts of personal relations to one another: with respect to the "natural" way father and son belong together, the formative association [*Bund*] between them is neither required nor is it motivated < in that association >.¹³¹ In the other sense, the concrete group-relationship [*bundhafte Verhältnis*] is precisely that which it is observed to be *hic et nunc*; it is not grounded in the community existing among the members of the group.

Thus the new relationship neither results from the existing community, nor does it consist, in its concrete determinedness, of the sense of the present community.¹³² This ties in with the relation of the community-free sphere to the community-restricted sphere. While the being together in partner-

ship, in its beginning and end, refers to partnership-free realms,¹³³ there is no reference of that sort either in the present being together in the community or in the existing community independent of its actualizations. Rather the free realms as free, and aside from their determinations of content, are supervenient to the community-restricted realms. For this reason, it is an affair pertaining to the particular person to the extent that he creates and assures for me beyond his community-restriction those free realms that are to be made individually his own and within which he enters into new and self-sufficient personal relations with others (without these relations being in need of a tendency directed against the community, just as generally, indeed, we always already belong to many communities related to each other in a "warped" way).¹³⁴ Likewise, it is left up to the particular person as to where the center of gravity of his existence lies, whether it is there where he is free and an individual or there where he is restricted and belongs. In this manner a plethora of possibilities result all of which, however, lie between two poles: the one forms an almost complete lapse into the bonds of the community, an almost exclusive orientation of comportment toward what is "taken for granted" as valid; the opposite pole is represented by the idea of the free individual by virtue of self-responsibility and who is autonomous in this sense.

§25. BEING TOGETHER IN THE COMMUNITY

We referred above¹³⁵ to the working together of members of a family community and emphasized that the persons involved did not fundamentally work together as partners because their being together resulted from a comprehensive life-context. Accordingly, we can say that in a being-together, for which the examples mentioned are paradigmatic, the community existing among the people in question is actualized; it is actualized insofar as the community exists as "natural" (in the sense given) membership independent of such actualizations. An actual being-together in the dimension of the community is motivated by the embracing life-context which it exhibits, and fits into it as a moment. This signifies that the particular, actual being-together receives its stamp and the structure characterizing it from the context "bearing" it and in this sense founding it. In this manner, the "whole" (the comprehensive life-context) is prior to the "parts" (the particular, actual being-together), and the "whole" is also "earlier" than the "parts." The priority of the "whole" over its "parts" and moments, and the "growing" of the "parts" out of the whole indeed always means that the "whole" is contained of sorts in its "moments." For this reason, a working together growing out of communal life, and the manner in which those concerned are together, is radically different from a work-

situation established by itself and in this sense independent, in which the partners encounter each other in their roles. However, not every being-together of the members of the community is of this sort, but instead only as that which proceeds from the community subsisting between them and which is motivated by the community itself. If two brothers play chess, they are, accordingly, together as partners and only as partners. The community existing between them does not project into the common situation and also does not contribute to their formation and determination of meaning.

Let us intuitively illustrate what has been detailed in the light of the analysis of a concrete communal action. As an example of the being-with-one-another that we have in mind, we shall choose the example developed by Scheler of the "immediate fellow-feeling, e.g., of one and the same sorrow with someone: mother and father standing beside the dead body of the loved child."¹³⁶ In this analysis of fellow-feeling with one another, understood as communal, we can provide a further confirmation of our thesis established following Schmalenbach—that is to say, the thesis that feeling is not constitutive for community, but rather that the converse is the case: the "community is found as already on hand," it "refers to what is already there, . . . knows what underlies and lies behind itself."¹³⁷ This feeling is grounded in the community on hand in such a way that the feeling is "present," contained in it, and bears its stamp in its concrete determinedness. The phenomenon at issue here is characterized by Scheler as a question "not only of living the same value complex with one another, but also the same emotional activity in it." "The 'sorrow' as value complex and the sorrowing as functional quality are, therefore, *one* and the same thing." But this characteristic is incomplete precisely in the respect of interest to us. As *sorrowing with one another*, and as *common*, grief emerges—not only objectively, but also phenomenally—from the communal life, from the living with one another in the family community. The misfortune that is in force in the grief concerns the family in its communalization. As a consequence, what is at issue here is characteristically different from the case where "A first feels the sorrow alone and then B feels it 'with him,'" ¹³⁸ not to mention the case where "A does not feel sorrow and B, however, feels it; they also indeed *know* in addition that they feel it." Just the growth of the actual grief out of the communal life determines it to be the concrete grief that it is and legitimates the distinction just drawn. While the community is included in the way peculiar to it in the actual grief, the latter is characterized as a mental awareness pertaining to the community in a quite determinate sense.

The inclusion of the community in the actual grief means, among other things, that each of the participants are present with the members of the community sorrowing "with them"; precisely *in* their grief are they related to the others and to their grief. This relation is not subsequently added on to the process of grieving of the particular person; rather, this is the determi-

nate concrete process of grieving that it is by virtue of this relation, which therefore also essentially belongs to it. That one livingly experiences something with another thus means that in the mental living of the one, the other participant and his mental living are constitutively contained. On that basis there also results the previously cited Schelerian characterization which, however, as we mentioned, does not touch upon what is central in the phenomenon. While we live in this grief, we have—as always and universally—an “implicit” knowledge about the others. Since the presence of the other in our present feeling makes up a constitutive moment of this feeling itself, the knowledge about this presence is a moment in our “implicit” knowledge about our actual affective situation.

In essence, the same result follows from the analysis of a case of comportment that does not have the form of being-with-one-another, but which, instead, has the form of consideration. If a member of a community acts in the name of the community and “in its spirit,” then the community, in consideration of which he acts, is present in his action even when the “on-looker” deliberately makes no impression on it.¹³⁹ Again, through this, its present, his action is made into what it is concretely: that is to say, into a community-action. In both cases, *the members of the community are present in one's own mental living and comportment themselves, and this, their present, is sense-determining for the mental living and comportment. The “implicit” knowledge about one's own mental living and comportment then discloses the others just as they are present in them.*

The being-together peculiar to the community precludes a reciprocal understanding of members of the community. Although this understanding does not arise alone out of the communal life, but instead is at its service, oriented toward things in common, it is an understanding into which one is born or into which one grows up.¹⁴⁰ It concerns members of the community as members, i.e., concerns them insofar as it engages the attention participating in the communal possession (in the sense of historical development). The limits of the understanding are the same here as there in consequence of the structural uniformity of the understanding meant here with the communal membership. The other understands his membership as membership and in respect of these limits of the understanding, not in respect of that which he himself is as an individual life-unity. Everything that accrues and belongs to him as this specific individual is withdrawn from this understanding. These limits appear most distinctly in the lack of understanding which a person encounters when he leaves the “natural” bonds of the community. This lack of understanding is not a mere not-understanding in the sense of not being troubled by it. It consists, instead, of the fact that the motives, thoughts, and actions of the people involved are interpreted by the others in “their” sense, in the sense of their tradition, their modes of thought. Outsiders are understood from the standpoint of the community

and in its sense and, therefore—necessarily—misunderstood. This is even the case where it is not a question of one growing out of or being detached from a community, but where a member of a community—at least at first—without disturbing his membership goes back to and tries to realize the supposedly genuine sense (back to what *should* be) of the community in opposition to its present status which would seem to be decadent. A classical example of this is Luther's appeal “*a pape male informato ad papem melius informandum.*” Whoever turns against the present status of the present structure of the community in the “name” of the community and for its own sake will be misunderstood from the standpoint of the present state of the community, i.e., from the standpoint of its development. This is because the present state of the community, for those still completely restricted to the community, as what has developed historically, has the characteristic of being taken for granted and taken as right peculiar to everything given historically and “naturally.”

This delimitation of understanding by its own historical communalization plays a role—as may still be noted—even in the sciences, especially in the human sciences, of which an example is the familiar attempt to interpret in these terms the primitive cultures of Western European modes of thinking and categories.¹⁴¹ Thus a problem is revealed which arises for the scientist precisely as scientist by virtue of his existence, namely by virtue of his historical communalization.

The investigator also makes use of the historical communalization of historical figures by making them into objects of his cognitive intentions. Precisely because the historian does not limit himself to the particular situation and what happens in it, i.e., to the concrete existence of a historical person, but sees instead persons in the light of their times, he asks about their communal membership and tries to understand them on that basis. Every regress to the “spirit of the times,” to the milieu, to the psychical flows and movements, signifies the placing of the persons involved in comprehensive life-contexts in which they are rooted as historical beings. That this procedure is, as we noted above, always possible and even necessary is a result of the essential historicity of human beings who always already exist with respect to a certain historical origin and by virtue of definite historical forces. A full historical awareness does not suffice with the understanding of particular concrete situations, but asks about grounds and contexts out of which the situations arose. This turn from concrete to *historical existence* constitutes each genuine and, so to speak, pregnant historical inquiry into its own specific characteristic. As a result, the historian makes explicit the “spirit” of the community involved, its manner of self-interpretation; he therefore explicates what is “taken for granted” and “naturally given” for people of the time in question, and for what reason they have a more or less “implicit” knowledge in their lives and actions.

Such a procedure is especially valid for the elaboration of the final and decisive positions in which this and that sort of human existence and the understanding of the being of human existence have their foundation. While the historian undertakes to clarify that sort of ultimate position, as well as the "things in common" for a certain group of people, on the basis of historical figures precisely in relation to their historical existence, he avails himself, as Spranger indicated,¹⁴² in fact, of a deductive method. And if this understanding aims at the historical existence of a person, then this means, again, that it is seized upon insofar and, however, also only insofar as he shares in the determinate historical "things in common." This signifies that man as individual, as "structured life-unity," escapes this understanding; that which is peculiar to man individually, which precisely makes man what he is as this unique human being, here remains inaccessible. This understanding does not bear upon the "individual ego" but rather on the "spiritual subject"; more correctly stated: it bears on the individual ego insofar, but only insofar, as it is determined by the "spiritual subject" "entwined within it."¹⁴³ This understanding that thematizes the community, and which turns to it in the corresponding attitude, has the same limit as that understanding pertaining to the being of the community; this limit is just that of communal membership. Spranger is correct¹⁴⁴ in distinguishing, in this connection, that understanding "arising from the objective situation," on the one hand, from that understanding "arising from the unity of the person" on the other hand. Accordingly, we must undertake a still further separation in the first case of understanding, depending on whether concrete or historical existence forms its theme.

CHAPTER THREE

FUSION

§26. FEELING UNITED AS "ONE"

For this third foundational sociological category we are indebted to Schmalenbach,¹⁴⁵ who sees the decisive difference between the "group" and the "community" in the emotionality constitutive for the group. Feeling-processes are given, as we have seen,¹⁴⁶ in the being-together of the partnership as well as in the dimension of the community. There the feelings in question, such as benevolence, cordiality, etc., supervene in the role-playing in the actual situation; they are without meaning for the sense of this being-together to the extent that the being-together is undisturbed by its appearance or failure to appear: the partners are and remain partners regardless of whether or not they have commerce with each other in a cordial or a business-like way. Feelings not only arise in the community by virtue of the communal living-together in the sense that they are presupposed as already "present" and "pre-given" prior to the community; the community is "present" in the feelings in question in the way described. In none of these cases do the feeling-processes themselves constitute the being-together of fellow human beings. *When, therefore—as in the case of the group—feeling-processes have that sort of constitutive meaning, when only by and essentially in them people come together, and when the sense of their being-together consists of the fact that they advert and are related to one another in feelings (as we shall see, an entirely determinate kind of feelings are involved), then a new and self-sufficient dimension of being-together of fellow human beings is, indeed, present.*¹⁴⁷

Whenever people are seized by a new "idea," a new feeling of life, a god, a hero, etc., and find themselves together as seized by them, then a new social formation arises among them. It is not only to be designated as new in the trivial sense that it only arises when the "idea" in question (or however one will designate that sort of thing) appears and people are carried away by it, while previously it did not exist; but, above all, it is to be designated as new insofar as existing communities and community-bonds can be disrupted by the devotion to what carries them away, and the formation of new communities is embarked upon; indeed, in a certain sense, the "world" in which the members of the group originate, and in which they grow up together in a community, is "dissolved" and a new "world" begins

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to emerge.¹⁴⁸ Because the formation of these new social consociations *can* mean the dissolution and destruction of the traditional communities (the mere *possibility* is sufficient here), it is shown that it is not a matter here of what belongs to the community. This is only rightly made known in the possible revolutionary and revolutionizing meaning of these groups, since, in contrast, the community possesses the characteristic of the traditional. It is certainly the case that the existence of things of the community, and hence of the community, is required for a group to exist at all: we must think, in this connection, of a language of the community as a presupposition of the reciprocal understanding, but also beyond that of a common destiny, a common need, and the like. Although this need is or can be that of the community, this group arises in the reaction to this need of the community or, better stated: the group that flares up is neither founded in the community nor is it carried by it. That there is a group at all is something new in contradistinction to communal growth. Even where, to a particular extent, a relation among communities is to be expected, and even exists in a manner not to be exhibited here, the being-together in the group is not determined and stamped by what lies and is rooted in the past; it is determined instead by the new which appears in the being-together in the group itself. In every relation, the flaring up of the group signifies the outbreak of something new.

We have already mentioned an "idea," a god, a feeling of life, a hero as examples of what manifests those involved in the being-together in the group. Whatever might be in particular concrete cases, it is always a question of something that is exceptional and *uncommon*. The uncommon, like the exceptional, does not have the meaning here of something that appears only seldom. The exceptional does not signify the same thing as the unusual; rather, something positive is meant by the phenomena under discussion. A "hero" or a "genius" is distinguished from people of daily life and is distinctive with respect to them; that which makes the "hero" a "hero" raises him above the average and everyday. It therefore makes no difference whatever if such a being comes along often or only rarely. The inner kind and the quality on which the distinctiveness rests over against the usual and the everyday, means primarily a fullness of power essentially accruing to what is thus distinctive. Because a "magician" or a "hero" can do things which transcend the forces and capacities of ordinary people, he is made distinctive: he is made known as an exceptional being in his exceptional deeds.

Max Weber introduced the term "charisma" for the whole realm of the phenomena at issue here—a term that we shall accept. As something exceptional, "charisma ought to signify the operative quality of a personality for the sake of which it is valued as endowed with supernatural or superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional, forces or properties not available to others, or as sent by god or as pre-figured and therefore valued as the

personality of a 'leader'. . . For the validity of charisma what is decisive is the assured, free *confirmation* of the one born to be a leader by the *recognition* of those governed on the basis of devotion to revelation, hero-worship, trust. But this is not (in the case of genuine charisma) the *ground* of legitimation; it is instead the *duty* of those summoned to recognize this quality in the name of vocation and confirmation. If the confirmation fails to last, the one who is charismatically blessed is abandoned by his god or his magic or heroic powers . . . thus his charismatic authority has the chance of disappearing."¹⁴⁹ Concerned with the "types of authority," the context of Weber's investigation implies that he views the charisma in advance as restricted to a human being (the "leader" with his "mission"). We shall disregard, first of all, this bond of charisma to the one "blessed" by it, which, in any case, is neither relevant nor accidental, and ask about the manner in which the charisma appears.

It is obvious that those whom the charisma "summons" are not "given" in the same way to historians and sociologists who confront the charismatic at a cognitive distance and stand over against it as their object. Even here the emphatically developed opposition between "living in . . ." and "standing over against" obtains. Charisma comes into appearance when it is "summoned"; it is seized upon by those who "summon" it insofar as they apprehend and follow the "call," i.e., those who are seized and carried away by it, surrender to it, believe in it, abandon themselves to it in a believing, trusting way.¹⁵⁰ Accordingly, devotion and being-seized are not kinds of founded acts built up on a prior givenness of charisma and which presuppose this being-given as their founding basis. Rather the exceptional, the uncommon, are grasped in those acts themselves; only to those who believe in it and surrender themselves to it does the charisma manifest itself; it is manifested to them precisely *in* these essential emotional acts.

Included in this "summoning," which is characteristic and essential for the charisma to make its appearance, is the fact that its manifestation is to be understood neither as a self-presentation, a self-offering, nor as a simple appearing and becoming present; on this basis one cannot say that it is "given" to those involved if one takes being-given in a strict and pregnant sense.¹⁵¹ It is in the emotional acts of devotion and the act of "believing in . . ." that the charisma manifests those who take part in it. It is referred to this emotion, so to speak, so that a corresponding sense in it be genuinely grasped as charisma. These emotional acts, however, are not just any sort of feelings; instead, they concern "*feeling united as 'one'*" and *identification*.¹⁵² The making-an-appearance of charisma signifies that it is, according to its essence, the over-powering, the power over those "summoned." *The making-an-appearance of charisma occurs in acts of feeling united as "one" with it: it genuinely manifests itself in devotion to it; this devotion is an affective identification with it.*

In the first place, the feeling united as "one" with the charismatic power

brings about its "harbingers," its "hero," its "master," its "leader," or however he is experienced and called by his followers. It is in him that the feeling united as "one" reaches the farthest and goes the deepest. Already his "call" to the harbingers signifies his becoming as "one" with the power which he "serves" and which "speaks" through him. The quality of the charismatic "leader" rests on the existential modification he carries out. The "leader" is therefore and thereby a "leader," i.e., distinguished from ordinary people and superior to them in that he stands in unity with the "summoning" power that he manifests. On the ground of this being as "one" with the charisma, his "message" has a "summoning" and, therefore, obligatory characteristic for the following. His sharing in the charisma is also to be understood in the sense of this becoming as "one" and being as "one," i.e., as *really* having a share in it and united in essence with it. This profound feeling united as "one," in which a person changes and his entire being is filled by the dominating charisma that seizes him, makes up the full and concrete sense of the "blessedness" under discussion here.

In a similar but correspondingly modified way "disciples" are subject to the charismatic power in feeling united as "one." In that connection, it makes no difference if they are seized "directly" by the charismatic power and then find among them someone who manifests this power in a particularly distinctive way such that he is, therefore, qualified as the "pre-determined leader," or if they only share in the full sense of the charisma by feeling united as "one" with the "leader." In any case, both sorts of feeling united as "one" are present in the sense of "discipleship": while the "disciples" feel themselves united as "one" with the "leader," they are aware—likewise by way of feeling united as "one"—of the charisma; in the feeling united as "one" with the charisma they also feel themselves united as "one" with the "leader" as the one who is particularly distinctive and "blessed."

The feeling united as "one" of the "disciples" with the "leader," the "belief of the disciples" in a charismatic person, is characterized by Scheler as a "spiritual-praxic self-identification with a person—a full identifying of oneself *for* and *in* the person . . . : the being united in positing as 'one' with the person-substance has, as a consequence, first of all, being united in thought as 'one,' being united in willing as 'one,' feeling united as 'one'—and, therefore, transformation and being united as 'one' in the formation of one's own self in the essence and form of the master; an enduring dynamic chain of always new reproductions of the form of the spiritual form of the master in the material of his own psychical data." The reference to the case of "becoming seized, gripped and overcome by the essence-form of the master," "of genuine identification with essence and form . . . in the sense . . . of a becoming, transforming, forming a unity of one's own personal substance . . . in short, of an ontic process," expresses the fact that the "disciples" acquire a real sharing in the "leader" in feeling united as "one"

with him and with the charisma incorporated in him.¹⁵³ Scheler also emphasizes that "such believing in" *must* be lived as a gift, as grace, as bestowing and not as a spontaneous performance of the person.

In another respect, nevertheless, feelings of being united as "one" have a meaning for the constitution of the group as well as for the actual being-together of members of the group. This actual being together in the group is itself a being together in feelings of being united as "one." Those gripped by the charisma are associated and united in it as "one." It is not the case that each of the members of the group is seized in and for himself, and still knows besides that the others are also seized in that way. It can be, in any case, that the members encounter each other after one of them has manifested the charisma, and, more particularly, has manifested it in his "solitude"; in contrast, there is the other possibility that the charisma is shown only in the being-together itself of the group in emotionally being with one another.¹⁵⁴ However, even in the first case the members do not encounter each other as, so to speak, enflamed in a "parallel" way; in that they encounter each other as human beings of one "spirit," they form a communal bond in the encounter itself.¹⁵⁵

This "being united as 'one' in spirit" is a distinctive feature for the being together in a group. It is *one* stream of feeling, *one* charismatic manifestation in which people live and which they allow of becoming a group. It is not only the case that everyone having a share in the manifestation of the charismatic "perceives" the others who are of a like "spirit" in the same manner that one also "perceives" the "leader." (Schmalenbach speaks here of a surrounding "central feeling," often of an imbedded "halo of feeling" or even of a "sea of feeling" that binds one to others.) It is also the case that, for the feeling united as "one" which we mean here, in turning to the members of the group they are "known" as people of the same "spirit," as co-enflamed. Accordingly, this "knowing" is a feeling united as "one" with the same stream of feeling in which the members of the group, standing in the reciprocal feeling united as "one," surrender themselves to the charismatic. *Because one and the same charismatic power is involved, a power which has taken possession of the members, and because each one of the members perceives this power, we may say that some sort of "fusion" takes place between them.*¹⁵⁶ As a consequence, this "fusion" is not supervenient to the feelings of being united as "one" in which the members of the group "know" each other as "brothers" of the "spirit"; rather, while they are immediately aware of the "spirit" dominating them in such feelings, they become welded together in feeling: they are mutually fused in the devotion to the charisma manifesting itself in them, which enraptures and unites all of them.

In this being-together peculiar to the group there is also a being with one another which is, however, different from that developed before in the

dimension of the community.¹⁵⁷ While the communal being with one another is constituted by the fact that in feeling, acting, etc., with one another, the other is present for each of the participants and is contained in the feeling, acting, etc., in the case of being with one another in the group the converse obtains: the feeling united as "one" with the "spirit" is constitutive for the being together in the group by which one is united as "one" with another.

Because the being-together under discussion possesses the properties that were just elaborated, certain limits, so to speak, affect the particular persons concerned. These limits are broken apart by the feelings of being united as "one"; all individual differences and separations are cancelled out.¹⁵⁸ Relevant for the discussion here is the "consciousness of We" analyzed by Vierkandt: "The intentional wall between the different participating persons is . . . set aside, in its place exists a peculiar unitary state . . . consciousness of the ego withdraws or entirely disappears . . . its place is taken by a consciousness of unity that is not only related to the act, but also allows the persons active in it, as persons, to be harmonized into a unity."¹⁵⁹ In contrast to the being-together in the partnership, that of the group has the characteristic of freedom insofar as it is not a consociate being-together in the surrounding-world situations in the sense of these situations and by virtue of them, insofar as it is not being together in roles determined by the situation; it is likewise free, as noted before,¹⁶⁰ in comparison to the being-together in the community because it does not proceed from the comprehensive life-contextures and is not motivated by them.

Since the group is constituted by the feelings of those entering into it, it rests entirely and exclusively upon the people who legitimate it; in contrast to both of the other dimensions, people in the group find themselves by virtue of themselves and on the basis of "individual events."¹⁶¹ These, and not the "natural" bonds or surrounding-world situations, ground the being-together in the group. Although people freely come together in the group, they lose their individual being and, more particularly, they lose it in a much more radical sense than in the case of the partnership or of communal membership. At the beginning as well as at the end, being together in the partnership itself refers to a domain free from the partnership;¹⁶² the communal membership contains, to be sure, no such reference to domains free from the community; but those domains are not inconsistent, in any case, with this membership when they are also added to the communal consociatedness so that people exist here *and* there.¹⁶³ In contradistinction, the mere possibility, the mere "idea" of being free of the group contradicts the being together in the group. He who being together in the group also only brings into view the possibility of a sphere free from the group will be "unfaithful," consequently, to the group in that he is not entirely and without reservation devoted to it, i.e., he places himself outside the group. Because one of those

boundaries contradicts the devotion to and sharing in the sense of the group, there is within the group the "requirement" of complete and unreserved identification of oneself with the group.¹⁶⁴ In a paradoxical way, one can say that people freely come together in being together in the group, the sense of which consists of the fact that they must give up all individuality.

Precisely because—as Scheler has described it—the feeling united as "one" with the charismatic person (as, universally, with everything charismatic) has the sense of a substantive change, of an "ontic process," those united "in the name" of and by the charisma are different from ordinary people. They are "chosen" and "elected" by the charismatic power itself. Insofar as the charisma manifests them, it "blesses" them in a way in which not everyone can share. The extraordinary quality of the charisma and the "election" of members of the group are made known here.

Because the religious, especially in its origin, shows the charismatic properties (the emergence of a religion is indeed nothing else than the charisma making its appearance),¹⁶⁵ the structures developed may be seen in particular pregnancy in religious or religiously oriented social groups. Each such group has a consciousness of "being different" in contradistinction—seen from its own standpoint—to "unbelievers," "apostates," "heretics," etc. This consciousness of the "elect" is especially intense in recent religions. In this regard we can refer to Weber's study of Calvinism and its "spiritual aristocracy of the saints *in* the world predestined by God from all eternity, an aristocracy which, with its *character indelibilis*, is separated, like the medieval monk, from the rest of humanity rejected from all eternity by an essentially unbridgeable and, in its invisibility, uncanny gulf."¹⁶⁶ But even in relatively stable religions, consciousness of being "chosen" has then a particular emphasis when the "community" resists the institutionalization of the religious, i.e., resists its becoming ordinary. This is seen in sects. The reason for this is that they, as a "voluntaristic association," are specifically like a group, while the "church" as an "institution of grace, . . . into which one is 'born,' " can be accepted as a paradigmatic example of community.¹⁶⁷ This distinction between "church" as a community and the sect as essentially a group reveals the pointlessness of all theories that are not oriented toward the moments constitutive for a consociation, but instead are oriented toward feelings and sentiments which the members foster toward one another without asking about the "place" of these feelings and sentiments within the present social structure—as we indeed asked before in relation to Gerda Walther.¹⁶⁸

In connection with this presentation of being together in the group and the constitutive meaning of feeling united as "one" for the form of this being-together, the difference between feeling united as "one" and emotional infection can be recognized in its entire extent. Scheler introduces feeling united as "one" and being united as "one" in positing as "only cases

of intensity, so to speak, limiting cases of infection"; for the latter mass-excitement serves as example.¹⁶⁹ In the case of mass-excitement, as Scheler himself suggested, and as Groethuysen had seen,¹⁷⁰ a knowledge about the mood of the participants need not be present. The emotional infection rests on the fact that a certain mood or atmosphere spreads out and infects newcomers.

It can already be seen here that infection neither legitimates an ontic relation to that by which one is infected, nor proceeds from an ontic relation: *in no sense and in no respect does infection imply an ontic relation among people.*¹⁷¹ Just because that is constitutive for feeling united as "one," it is not to be understood as a limiting case of infection, but instead as different from it. On the basis of the difference just developed, Weber's remarks about "action conditioned by the masses" can be corrected.¹⁷² What he calls "mere influence" and "only reactive imitation" are to be understood in terms of our presentation as results of infection; in contrast, what he calls "meaningful orientation of one's own comportment toward someone else's comportment" implies an ontic relation to others in one of the dimensions referred to here, with the exception of the case he himself mentions where someone sees a purposeful organization in another and takes it over provided that both are not together as partners. In the latter case, it is a matter of an orientation of the one to the other in the ontic relation of partnership: an "imitation" is not present here even in actuality, but the one focuses on the other in his comportment. If someone "imitates" something because it is accepted as "exemplary, or as officially noble," he makes known therefore his wish to belong to this group in question: he offers it, so to speak, to a group. If he imitates, in contrast, something "because it is the 'fashion,'" i.e., because everyone does it, then, in fact, a "mere imitation" is present here: he is infected by the "fashion" without there being an ontic relation to another or also only the wish for it. There is no "imitation" at all of what is "accepted as traditional"; this is because what is at issue is neither a question of a tradition in which one has grown up (for there is no imitation present), nor is it even a matter of a tradition belonging to it (for one does not imitate something traditional; instead, the first case mentioned obtains). Weber comprises all of this in a unity. The confusion rests, on the one hand, on certain points of Weber's methodology, the weaknesses of which Schmalenbach has pointed out;¹⁷³ on the other hand, it also rests on the completely unclarified concept of imitation with which he works.

§27. ON PHENOMENOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION AND ITS
APPLICATION TO RELATIONS AMONG FELLOW HUMAN BEINGS

The remarks preceding about the charisma and its manifestations, about feeling united as "one," and about their meaning are deliberately oriented phenomenologically to the extent that they inquire about the sense of the phenomena and the manners in which there is awareness of them. To the extent required and demanded by our problem, we have tried to clarify what these awareness-processes are, what sense they have, what lies in them, how and as what they are lived by the persons involved. Accordingly, the full concrete sense of the problem is to be understood in the sense of the phenomena and the modes of awareness under discussion; they need not be "interpreted" from some "standpoint" or other. Instead, they must be taken and explicated in accord with their full and concrete content. In the full, concrete sense of the phenomena in question understood in this fashion, it is also the case that they need not be understood as only subjective states (such as joy or sorrow), nor that we should see in them projective processes by which what is specifically human, in cosmo-vitally feeling united as "one," is affectively projected, phantasied or in some way transferred to Nature structured in an entirely different way. For those people feeling united as "one" with Nature, Nature *is* something completely different when they stand over against it and investigate it as scientists. Nature is, in each case, controlled by living forces specifically peculiar to it of which man is immediately aware in feeling united as "one" with Nature and in which he, in this manner, acquires a real share. Correspondingly, in the sense of each case of being seized by the charismatic there is the fact that, accordingly, a divine or otherwise extraordinary power is manifested with which the person involved enters into an ontic relation and in which he acquires a share. Justice must be done to all of this in the description and analysis of the phenomena involved.

But the task of *presenting and accepting* these phenomena with respect to their sense and content, of, so to speak, *joining in them, is two-fold. Precisely the latter is not included in the intention of our considerations.* We take up these phenomena vis-à-vis the attitude of the "phenomenological epoché."¹⁷⁴ We exhibit, describe, and analyze them, try to develop their meaning for those involved, inquire into the extent to which these modes of awareness are determinant for the manner of existence. But we do not appropriate them, nor their corresponding phenomena; we make no use of them, we do not build upon them; they do not provide us with any foundations upon which we must place ourselves. When, for example, we speak of the "leader" and his "mission," we take these phenomena just, and only just, as what they are for the people involved. For us, however, there is, as it were, nothing binding in this manifestation; we do not place ourselves on

its ground; we do not join in the manifestation, even when it affects us ourselves.¹⁷⁵ In our investigation, the "leader" is not regarded actually as "leader"; nor do we benefit from his "mission" which we need not take as having to be accepted by us and as obligating us. All of this only functions for us as phenomena, i.e., as something intended to in such and such a way in determinate modes of mental awareness. We deal with this intending-to purely as intending-to; we draw no conclusions that would transcend the phenomena and modes of awareness themselves. For this reason, whenever we spoke of charismatic forces, qualities, persons, and their ontic relations deriving their sense from the charisma in question, we put the terms in quotation marks.

With this orientation our presentations stand in opposition to Scheler's purposes. Although Scheler, as we noted and back to whom we must refer, regards feeling united as "one" as a limiting case of emotional infection, and assigns its "place" in the constitution to "vital consciousness,"¹⁷⁶ he regards it as the "genuine and true" metaphysical source of cognition for only certain graspable sides of the existing universe regarded as in itself.¹⁷⁷ Because the positive sciences, with respect to their sense, neither aim at "pure" cognitions nor even lead to them, it follows from Scheler's theory of science mentioned earlier¹⁷⁸ that he appeals beyond them to the "seeing of essences" (which, however, means something different from what it does in Husserl, and rests on a misunderstanding of the "phenomenological reduction");¹⁷⁹ he appeals to the feeling united as "one" with the metaphysical primal ground of the world, characterized by urges and drives, as well as to the vehicle of a pure or, as he also calls it, "philosophical," cognition. In the framework of this essay we can enter neither into a critical discussion of Scheler's theory of science nor into a critical discussion of the cognitive meaning that he claims for feeling united as "one"; and we cannot do so because an essential exposition of these problems is possible only on the basis of explicating the problem of existence and cognition. In order to avoid misunderstandings with respect to our account, we must, nonetheless, note that Scheler's position just mentioned does not result without further ado as a consequence of the "acceptance" and phenomenological analysis of the phenomena of feeling united as "one." Similarly, when we take over Scheler's *descriptions* and *analyses*, we do not make his *position* our own. Even if a problem of cognition arises with respect to the feeling united as "one," as well as universally with respect to "living in . . .," of which feeling united as "one" is a mode—a problem that cannot be developed here—this does not alter the fact that, in a strict and pregnant sense, cognition is to be acquired *exclusively* on the road that leads to science.

§28. THE CHARISMA AS THE PHENOMENON OF THE BEGINNING

We have described being together in the group as the fusion of the persons involved who experience themselves as animated by the same "spirit." The charisma, in which they are united in the group, is essentially extraordinary and exceptional. In its qualities, there is the fact that those affected surrender themselves to it and, as it were, are wholly filled with it in its manifestation. Devotion to the charisma and feeling united as "one" with it always have the characteristic of *ecstasy*: the new which makes its appearance here is so powerful and so over-powering that it takes possession of the people to whom it is manifest with an extraordinary exclusivity; it neither tolerates nor even lets anything else accompany it. That the charisma is seized and perceived in ecstasy literally signifies that the one who is "called upon" "steps outside" himself. *That, out of which one steps, is the "world," particularly insofar as one grows up with it and is rooted in it. In being devoted to and seized by the charisma, one loses the "world."*

This ecstatic withdrawal is obviously different *toto coelo* from being over against and contemplating the world from the distance of cognition. In this case, one steps back, separates himself from the world, since one (understood in the narrowest sense) no longer lives in it. To be sure, by standing over against the world such that the world is made an object of intensive acts, one does not immediately lose the world: the "world" is and remains there, and advertences toward it still obtain. In contrast, in ecstasy one is torn from the "world." What manifests itself here is so over-powering—the extraordinary, indeed, has an immediate sense of an infinite superiority over everything belonging to daily life—that it allows nothing to exist before it. The disappearing of the "world" signifies, accordingly, that it sinks away into a dark, undetermined distance. At the high point of ecstasy the "world" is never visible at the horizon.¹⁸⁰ Because, in its manifestation, the charisma displaces the "world," the groups, formed in terms of it, tear their members away from their ordinary, worldly bonds. It is precisely in contrast to communities that the uncommon and extraordinary power is tested, especially when the new turns *against* the concrete status of a certain community—which, to be sure, need not be the case, but often enough occurs. Those seized by the charisma abandon the communities to which they belong and draw together into the groups in which they are united in and by the charisma.

These groups certainly do not lie on the other side of the existing communities in which the persons have grown up. Entering into the group signifies, instead, a rejection of "natural" membership: "the bearers of the charisma" place themselves "outside the bonds of this world."¹⁸¹ Along with the daily world, ordinary ties to possession, home, family, nation, etc., sink away for those seized by the "mission." Conversely, the manifestation of the

charismatic and the flaring up of groups are particularly favorable to those epochs in which, because of some need or other, communal bonds are loosened. Those people whose bonds to what has been handed down and transmitted have weakened, and for whom the traditional, hence the taken-for-granted, has become problematic in a determinate way, are to a conspicuous extent directly predestined for the impression of the new that the manifestation of the charismatic signifies: that against which the new power prevails is, in these cases, already weak.

Along with the "world" becoming lost, there is the lack of spheres free from the being together in the group,¹⁸² which is characteristic of being together in the group. This is because spheres free from the group would, according to their sense, be domains of the "world" that remains outside and alongside of the charismatic and untouched by it.

Feelings of being united as "one" and ecstasy, constitutive for the manifestation of the charismatic and for being together in the group, possess an instability entirely peculiar to them. Primarily, we do not necessarily mean by this that the possibility that the authority would be forfeit in the event that the charismatic rulership would not be "confirmed," i.e., not the instability of that charismatic social relation to which Weber has already referred.¹⁸³ Feelings of being united as "one" and ecstasies are rather unstable in themselves: they cannot persevere at their high point; they increase and diminish by virtue of which, in any case, they do not continue unchanged.¹⁸⁴ They repeat themselves; but they have already lost some of the original force. If the extraordinary manifests itself always and again, it will still not be, of course, ordinary and familiar; instead, the manifestation of the extraordinary will no longer have the captivating force peculiar to the original manifestation. But this signifies that the "world" reappears.

Admittedly the "world" now reporting itself is not identical with the one that existed prior to the charisma making its appearance. Those "called" by the charisma are not simply carried along by intoxicating excitations which die away and fade from notice, as is the case with the moods by which one is infected.¹⁸⁵ That they stand, and still stand, in the feeling of being united as "one" with the charismatic, and thus acquire a real share in it, signifies: they themselves have suffered changes in the ecstasies; the new, manifested in them, changes them insofar as their existence derives its sense from the new and no longer from what is transmitted in tradition. Thus changed, the "world" returns to view for them: but it is no longer the old "traditional world"; rather, the "world" and the orders and institutions contained in it, e.g., the political, legal, social institutions, are to be understood with respect to and in the sense of the irruption and arrival of the new. And if the "world" has changed, this signifies that the concrete charisma under discussion has entered into the "world"; as a consequence, the "world" undergoes

a decentralization, and its change consists in this decentralization.

By entering into the "world," the charisma develops into a revolutionary power—or, as Weber says,¹⁸⁶ it develops into the "specifically revolutionary power of history." It does not revolutionize primarily "things" and orders. Instead, it revolutionizes people "from within" while changing and giving them a new meaning of existence—Weber speaks of a central "metanoia of sentiments"—and then allows them, as so changed, to overthrow the "traditional world." Every overthrow of prevailing, customary orders, every new order of the "world" over against tradition, according to Weber, goes back to the influence of charismatic persons on their followers who, for their part, enforce in the world the "it is written—but I say unto ye" of the "master," and construct the new that corresponds to it.¹⁸⁷ In this "it is written—but I say unto ye," the power and superiority of the charismatic "mission" is made known. More particularly, the charismatic no longer tears those "summoned" from the "world." To the contrary, it enters into the "world" and conquers it, not allowing anything to exist that does not correspond to it or which contradicts it. The "world" emerging and gradually being formed on the ground of the manifestation of the charisma is oriented in the sense of the "new and presuppositionless," while the ingrown, traditional "presuppositions" are overthrown. This new "world" rests solely on the charisma involved and on what is contained in it, issuing from it as resting on its own presuppositions. *In its historical relationship, the charisma is a phenomenon of the beginning; it introduces a new existence and gives a meaning to a "world."*¹⁸⁸

No realm of necessity is saved from this revolutionary transformation. Step by step the new penetrates all domains of life; gradually all spheres of the "world" and of life are transformed and renewed in its sense. This conquering of the "world" by the charisma means, however, its fall in the "world": the more the charisma penetrates the "world" and enforces itself in it, the more it recedes from this, its origin, the more it falls into mundanization¹⁸⁹ and becomes legalized and traditionalized.¹⁹⁰ For the charisma, this process is the "way . . . to a long, slow death"; along this way, it loses its own peculiar characteristic. The charismatic authority flows into the "institutional"; to be sure, these "institutions" appeal to the charismatic making its appearance, as Weber has detailed for royalty, the nobility, and others. But in the fact that the "institutions" are legitimated by having descended from ancestors who were "chosen" and "destined," it is revealed that they have their legitimation in what is transmitted and ingrown, and not simply in something genuinely charismatic. In this development the charisma forfeits its revolutionary meaning and is transformed into its opposite: in some manner or other, and according to some rules or other, it itself becomes something traditional which is passed on. What originally "summoned" and "awoke" the people, what tore them from their communal bonds, what

united them into free groups, becomes along the way a constituent and possession of a community that lives by virtue of the historically developed "spirit." At the end of this way, there is always the transformation into the communal, which is taken for granted and in which one grows up.

The corresponding change is also suffered by the groups in which those "summoned" by the charisma are united. The instability immanent to the group as group, as Schmalenbach argues,¹⁹¹ is forced into the reception of the "faithful" in order to bestow duration on the group involved—but the "faithful" already have a "social character"; they form the foundation for all social formations for which the principle, "*pacta sunt servanda*," is constitutive and which can only exist in strict adherence to this principle—i.e., just of the "society" in the proper sense. The "vow of the faithful," which, like every promise, presupposes "free" and autonomous people, is only genuinely "social" to the extent that those who can promise something are not hindered by a third party while adhering to the promise. More important than this penetration of the group by moments of origin alien to the group is the gradual concretion of persons by virtue of whom the group becomes a "community." In the charismatic, which has lost its genuine characteristic and becomes a traditional good, the members of the group grow up—at one with this process—and belong to each other such that their membership has as its foundation what has become taken for granted and traditional. Locked into this process, pure communities then arise whose origin in the group is scarcely visible. *This making ordinary of the originally extraordinary and uncommon, as well as the parallel transformation of the group into the community, does not result only in fact—hence the transformation law does not have the sense of being simply a law discovered by induction; it is a question, rather, of a priori and eidetic necessities in which all instability essential to the group has its ground.* Thus religious groups become "churches" in Weber's sense, i.e., become institutions with a traditional characteristic; charismatic military authority is transformed into patrimonialism;¹⁹² parents grow into a family together, etc. Indeed, whether or not the "'communal table' of a war lord with his following has a 'patrimonial' or 'charismatic' characteristic cannot be outwardly observed; it depends on the 'spirit' animating the community, and that signifies that it depends on the basis that supports the ruler: tradition, divine authority, or personal pagan belief."¹⁹³

On these grounds we cannot accept without qualification Scheler's "identification of 'primitive' thinking, viewing, feelings of primitive people of the lowest level" as examples of feeling united as "one," which we understand here always in the sense of unification in a group and fusion.¹⁹⁴ This is because it makes a difference whether the primitive person is already born into the unity with his totem animal, the unity then being "present" as "given" and taken for granted; or whether the unity only arises in the actual

emotional acts of feeling oneself united and of fusion, therefore arising only in explicit unification, and is referred to these acts in order for them to exist at all. The difference itself does not become fluid by the fact that there is a necessary and, in the essence of the phenomena, grounded developmental tendency from the one to the other, nor by the fact that in the stages of this development the difference is not always made without difficulty, even being at times impossible.

§29. THE FUNDAMENTAL SOCIOLOGICAL CATEGORIES AS STRUCTURES OF "LIVING IN . . ."

Our analyses of being together with other people have led us to the elaboration of three dimensions of the encounter of fellow human beings and their being-together: partnership, membership, and fusion. In that connection, we have continually referred the material relationships and affinities of what we presented to the sociological categories of society, community, and group. If we have not directly appended the sociological investigations in question, and if we have not also taken over the concepts of sociology, this is because we meant to clarify the *primary* sense of these fundamental sociological categories by means of the analyses of the *particular sense of being together of fellow human beings*.

It requires no explanation to see that these classificatory concepts are not concepts of concrete social consociations such as, e.g., the concepts of corporations, house-hold communities, political parties, and the like; nor are any of these concepts superordinate generic concepts, such as the concept of any economic consociation whatever. They are also, however, of an essentially different structure than those concepts designating determinate social levels, such as, e.g., the concepts of the middle class, the peasantry, the proletariat. These fundamental categories do not mean, even in abstract universality, determinate concrete social consociations; the distinctions obtaining between them do not signify any classification of social consociations. Instead, they involved the manner in which people *sociate* [*soziiert*]¹⁹⁵ with one another in concrete social associations. On these grounds, Schmalenbach has designated the categories in question as "the most universal *modal* categories": they "are modes . . . manners of existence in which . . . each . . . 'substantial' formation . . . can exist," whereby these three modes "in advance" and "essentially" mutually condition each other.¹⁹⁶ Although "the 'substantial' social formations are neutral over against the 'modes' up to certain limits, . . . many of them nevertheless <have> . . . a particular affinity to one or the other or to the third of the foundational sociological categories"—e.g., juristic and economic relations to the category of "society," intimate and family relations to the category

of "community," religious consociations to the category of "group."

Because the difference of the three "modal categories" is related to "fundamental differences in the pure 'eidetic' sphere,"¹⁹⁷ this interpretation of the fundamental sociological categories signifies that the *Eidos* "*societas*" prescribes Being in one of these modes to the subordinate singularities (eidetic as well as empirical), whereby the particular clamping together of the three categories is still to be considered—categories that result from their essentially mutual conditionedness. The three "modal categories" are fundamental regional-ontological¹⁹⁸ categories precisely of the object-region, any "*societas*" whatever. They determine the specific manner of existence peculiar to each object of this region on the basis of just its regionality; they are the legitimating categories for that Being which accrues to the objects of the region in question. Therefore, it is a manner of the fundamental, material-ontological structure of a wholly determined object-realm and the Being belonging to it: *they constitute the Being-structure just of this and no other realm of objects.*

This object-ontological interpretation of the three "modal categories" of sociology has its justification without question in certain limits. But that they do not express the *primary* and *original* sense of the three modes has been shown by Schmalenbach in a more recent work.¹⁹⁹ While raising the problem of a "sociology of relationships among material affairs," and mentioning the "property relationships," the "traditional growth," and the "emotional associatedness" as modes of possible ontic relationships among "material affairs," he himself refers to their kinship with the sociological categories of "society," "community," and "group": "they are the same categories that everywhere signify the legitimating modal categories for sociology."²⁰⁰ But with this the object-ontological interpretation splits apart. If one can "stand in relationship to people as . . . well as to material affairs . . . furthermore, in addition, also to gods, to ideas, and to many other things besides belonging to communities, societies, and groups," then these categories are not restricted just to a specific realm of objects and have a universal meaning as the only meaning that provides the formal structure of the Being belonging to this realm. *Instead, they involve the most universal and fundamental modes of "being with . . ." which is equivalent to "living in . . ." With their totality and with their being clamped together they make up the structures of "living in . . ."* Our analyses of an inseparable being-together with fellow human beings led just to this result, a being-together that we say is inseparable because in it one does not stand over against other people and make them objects of cognitive intentions, but rather lives with them in something and encounters them. *What we have described under the heading of partnership, membership, and fusion as three dimensions of being together are precisely modes of being together with others, modes of encounter of fellow human beings in the milieu-world character-*

ized by the fact that we live in it rather than stand over against it.

That the fundamental sociological categories become visible to us primarily as modes of being with others, and not as fundamental regional-ontological categories that are essentially related, and only related, to a determined, circumscribed object-realm, results from the difference of our setting of the problem in contrast to the setting of the problem in sociology. For the attitude and observation of sociology, which contemplates and makes things objective from a distance, human being is an object to which, among others, properties and determinations of social "dispositions," "drives," "tendencies," and the like, accrue, on the basis of which one interacts with others and comports himself toward them in entirely determinate but still differentiated ways. While people, as a consequence of their social "drives" and "tendencies" do things together and enter into various bonds, social formations arise which form the realm of sociological research. These social formations are *sui generis* objects²⁰¹ of sociology, which then inquires into their determinations, structures, and the sets of laws that govern them. Thus the problem emerges of the most universal, and, therefore, in a certain sense, "formal" structures of social formations, the problem of a classification of types of *forms* of association that "formal sociology" investigates. In all social formations determinate bonds of association exist among the people gearing into the formations; "society," "community," and "group" are designated as the most universal *typical* forms of these bonds of association. As a result, these forms do not allow of being reduced to social "dispositions" and other determinations of those who fashion the formations because they are form-types of specific social formations which, precisely as objects *sui generis*, cannot be reduced to any other sort of objects. For these reasons the form-types mentioned must obtain as object-structures that specifically belong to a determinate object-class and are restricted to this. If one proceeds to carry out an ideating abstraction, observing the *Eidos*, any "*societas*" whatever, "contained" in all concrete social formations, then, as we saw, those form-types result as fundamental regional-ontological categories.

The objectivities under discussion, the social formations, are now constituted, however, when people are together in determinate ways and comport themselves toward one another in every case according to the kind of being-together. This relation to any being-together whatever of fellow human beings is also constitutive for the highest *Eidos* of the object-region in question, any "*societas*" whatever. But that human beings interact at all, that they stand in ontic relations with one another, and comport themselves toward one another by virtue of them, does not consist of people being driven toward other people, feeling themselves drawn to them, and the like, on the basis of objective object-determinations (in our case, on the basis of "dispositions," "drives," and "tendencies"). Rather, being together with

others is grounded in being-in-the-world which always signifies being among fellow human beings in the world.

We are, therefore, dealing with an "existential."²⁰² Only on the ground of being-in-the-world-with-others does it make sense to speak at all of social "dispositions," etc.; they presuppose, rather than constitute, the being-together of fellow human beings. Only a being to whose ontic meaning belongs being-with-others can have "dispositions," "drives," and "tendencies" in relation to these others. At the empirical level, the validity of priority of the ontic structure mentioned over the social "dispositions" consists of the fact that social "dispositions" can only acquire development and full cultivation in being together with others.²⁰³

If we investigate—as we have tried to do—being-in-the-world-with-others as a moment of any being-in-the-world whatever, and inquire into it with respect to its modalities, we then find, as a result, the dimensions elaborated of partnership, membership, and fusion. Insofar, now, as the particular being together of fellow human beings constitutes a social formation in one of these dimensions which, in fact, is exhibited in the thematizing observation as an object *sui generis*, there is then yielded the most universal form-types of these social formations—and, in ideating abstraction, the fundamental ontological categories of this object-region—constituted as derivations of modalities of being-in-the-world-with-others.

In order to do justice to this contexture, and in order to develop the original meaning of the fundamental sociological categories, we have chosen expressions for the designations of these dimensions of being together of fellow human beings which, in accord with their sense, designate modes of living with others in the milieu-world.

If object-categories and even also regional-ontological categories result as derivations of existential modes, then that means that the objects in question are constituted when people live and interact in determinate modes in the milieu-world. But by no means does this lead to the idea that always and everywhere regional-ontological categories, and other sorts of object-categories, are derivations of existentials and their modes, just as the contexture shown is not a special case of a universal law of derivation obtaining between categories and existentials.

When, as in the case of the three dimensions, we are concerned with modes and modal differences of being-together-with-others, this does not yet produce a classification of the human beings with whom we deal and, in some fashion, sociate. We can be together with the "same" people in various dimensions, whereby the identity of the "same" people enduring throughout all situations and all dimensions becomes a problem. In the analysis of partnership we referred to the fact²⁰⁴ that the partner was in every case defined by the concrete situations. Still more relevant than the differences of these concrete situations (in which it is, after all, still a question of

encounters within one and the same dimension), are precisely the dimensional differences for what the person encountered is to me. If, say, those belonging to the community are together in a situation that transcends the bonds of their community, then they encounter each other as partners and are *hic et nunc* also nothing more than partners to one another; correspondingly, when a group is formed between them, they are together in the group. In contrast, they are members of specifically communal situations and, more particularly, they are members quite apart from all possibilities of being together in other dimensions.

As a consequence, one cannot conceive, as Löwith does, those with whom one is sociated as organized into a single sphere. According to Löwith,²⁰⁵ "those whom I know," whom I encounter on the street "among others," are distinguished "from all others as unknown to me. Within this 'sphere'—at the implicit center of which I myself am—members are distinguished, in turn, from those who are mine as the *ones who belong to the 'sphere.'* And among those who belong, those who are *mine* are first called 'thou' in the proper sense." Only because Löwith overlooks the dimensions and their differences and tends toward a one-dimensional description of fellow human beings which, in actuality, presents an absolutizing of the dimension of partnership, does the image of the sphere seem adequate to him for exhibiting my ontic relations to others who, according to the place in the sphere, are "those who belong and are outsiders [*Fremde*], standing nearby or far away." But the differences which are observed here are not quasi-quantitative and gradual. One must make visible first of all the differences of the dimensions as different modes of being with others. In each of these dimensions there are "spheres," and, more particularly, frequently different ones. And within each of these "spheres" one can distinguish being nearby or far away. But the most important differences are those of the dimensions themselves.

Because being together with other people is always being together with them in the world, the dimensions of being together of fellow human beings are, at the same time, dimensions of being-in-the-world itself. In the discussion of the community as founded community,²⁰⁶ we referred to the possession belonging to the community (also and directly to the "material" possession) in which one has grown up and to which one stands in a community-relationship; correspondingly, we accepted Scheler's notion of "cosmo-vital feeling united as 'one'" as the paradigm of an ontic relationship of the group to Nature. As the social ontic relationship to "things" we considered mere manipulating and dealings with utensils.²⁰⁷ When, in this connection, Schmalenbach refers to the property relationship, he is right to the extent that in a utensil employed that way others can be "co-included," such as those from whom it is bought, exchanged, given as a gift, etc. Precisely because *partnership*-situations are "co-included," it is already indicated that the ontic relation to the utensil in question grounded in those

situations is a relation corresponding to the partnership. With respect to the referential phenomena pointed out before,²⁰⁸ the *identity of the modes* of being together of fellow human beings and their being-in-the-world allows of being seized upon in the most pregnant way. When, in the horizons of particular manipulation-situations, encounter-situations with other people (and, therefore, these people themselves) are "co-included" with the utensil with which we deal and which we manipulate, and when, conversely, reference is made from concrete, actual being together of fellow human beings to the utensil and situations in the surrounding world of utensils, then in all of these cases the ontic relationship to "what is co-included" is the same as that in which it is "co-included."

By the fact that our continuous daily "knowledge" about a surrounding world of fellow human beings and the "knowledge," of essentially the same kind, about the world of "material things" are in every case abstract moments in our universal "consciousness of world," it becomes clear that any modes of "living in . . ." whatever are equally modes of being in relation to the "things" as well as also modes of being with others. If our continual conviction about the world surrounding us undergoes an articulation through the dimensions of being together of fellow human beings, then this articulation also affects our daily conviction about the surrounding world of utensils in which we live. Accordingly, both daily convictions are articulated in precisely the same way.

NOTES

NOTES TO EDITORIAL PREFACE

- 1 The dissertation appeared in the journal, *Psychologische Forschung*, 12 (1929), pp. 279–381.
- 2 The extent to which Gurwitsch remained unsatisfied with the conclusion of his dissertation can be seen from the fact that he would not allow the Note and Concluding Observation to be translated for the English edition of his essays; see Gurwitsch's Introduction to his *Studies in Phenomenology and Psychology* (Evanston, 1966), p. XV.
- 3 In this connection, see Gurwitsch's *Phenomenology and the Theory of Science*, edited by Lester Embree (Evanston, 1974), pp. 154–158 and 211–220.
- 4 See the two texts of Gurwitsch, "Zur Bedeutung der Prädestinationslehre für die Ausbildung des 'kapitalistischen Geistes,'" *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, 68 (1933), pp. 616–622; and the review of Leo Strauss, *Die Religionskritik Spinozas als Grundlage seiner Bibelwissenschaft*, in *Göttingische gelehrte Anzeigen* (1933), pp. 124–149.
- 5 See the essay, "Ontologische Bemerkungen zur Axiomatik der Euklidischen Geometrie," *Philosophischer Anzeiger*, 4 (1929/30), pp. 78–100.
- 6 On the problem of the "concept of the psychical as consciousness" there exists a handwritten manuscript dealing with historical interpretations of this concept (see below, §10, pp. 47f.); there is also the manuscript of the lecture, referred to below, p. 81. This lecture is concerned with the problem of existence.
- 7 In a letter of 17 July 1930 Husserl had informed Gurwitsch that "with all my heart" he wished to "help as much as possible" with Gurwitsch's habilitation essay. On a similar occasion Husserl added some advice of a practical kind on which he expanded in a letter of 18 June 1930. Husserl also did not delay in expressing his esteem for Gurwitsch to others; see, among other letters, the one of 3 April 1932 to A. Grimme: "Dr. Gurwitsch, who as I have heard is one of your protégés, has developed into one of the serious hopes for future phenomenology. He deserves every assistance." ["Dr. Gurwitsch, der wie ich höre zu Ihren Schützlingen gehört, hat sich zu einer ernstlichen Hoffnung für die künftige Phänomenologie entwickelt. Er verdient jede Förderung."]
- 8 "Ich weiss nun wirklich nicht, wie ich raten und helfen soll. Ihr Schicksal geht mir nahe und meine sorgenden Gedanken sind oft bei Ihnen. Ihre Begabung schätze ich hoch ein, wenn Ihr philosophisches Ethos standhält, ist für Sie eine bedeutende Zukunft zu erhoffen. Die neue Wendung der Philosophie durch die Eröffnung der phänomenologischen Methodik und Problematik bedarf, um sich in grossen Zügen auszuwirken, solcher Kräfte. Sie bedarf der seltenen Persönlichkeiten, die den Radikalismus philosophischen Fragens und philosophischer Redlichkeit der Arbeit